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Abstract 
 
 
This paper presents an opportunity for the uncertainty that has plagued the novel's criticism to 
appear as absences in the body of historical knowledge, particularly regarding the notion of life 
after death. Taking appearance (eg. proof of existence), as opposed to disappearance, as a 
universally accepted value allows this analysis to interrogate the novel's logic in relation to a variety 
of conventional systems whose very existence depends on the reproduction of their system. The 
ineffectuality of Foucauldian disciplinary institutions in the novel establishes the threat of 
nonexistence. A significant relationship to Dante's Inferno is rendered, lending the appearance of 
language an 'enchanted' value through allusions to Dante's intentional invocation of Augustinian 
corporeal vision. The novel's metalanguage appears enchanted by the body of historical knowledge, 
particularly as the product of capitalism, discipline and Judeo-Christianity, and programmed by 
literary precursors William S. Burroughs, Gertrude Stein and Ernest Hemingway. Foregrounded by 
this complex network, an analysis of the novel’s first chapter demonstrates how an attention to 
appearance brings the language to life and draws the narrator, equally invested in appearance, into 
its realm of representation.  
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1. Ellis and Controversy of American Psycho 
 
Of the seven novels that author Brett Easton Ellis has published, it was his third work, American 
Psycho that solidified his reputation as one of America's most controversial authors. The most 
infamous aspect of the author's controversial reputation stems primarily out of the novel's 
extraordinarily-detailed descriptions of the narrator's misogynistic violence. The majority of 
American Psycho is narrated in the first-person voice of a character, described in Ellis's later novel, 
Lunar Park, as “a young, wealthy, alienated Wall Street yuppie named Patrick Bateman who also 
appeared to be a serial killer filled with vast apathy during the height of the Reagan eighties”(Ellis 
Lunar 12). As many readers failed to distinguish between the author of the work and the narrator in 
the novel, Ellis himself was widely demonized.1 
 
Ellis's new novel would, in itself, be something of an anticipated event as he was already a 
recognized celebrity of popular culture, a voice for “twentysomething” Generation X-ers and an 
author who could demand a $300K advance; but, it was the novel's highly-offensive, misogynistic 
violence that would be most responsible for the novel's publicity and mark the occasion of it's 
publication as one of the rare controversial moments in recent literary history. The controversy 
began before the novel was published, when female employees at Simon and Schuster – the 
publishing house that paid Ellis's advance – complained about its depictions of violence against 
women. Despite these complaints, the publishing house advertised the book, listed it in the catalogs 
of forthcoming releases, distributed press packets including advanced copies and made plans for a 
publicity tour. After Time and Spy magazines published excerpts taken from the advanced copies 
that exemplified its violence along with articles criticizing Simon and Schuster's decision to publish 
the novel, the publishing house withdrew their offer to publish (Cohen). Within days, however, 
Random House acquired the publication rights, published American Psycho under their Vintage 
series and began distributing the novel at the end of February 1991. Subsequently, two divisions of 
Random House became the political targets of Tammy Bruce, the president of the Los Angeles 
chapter of the National Organization for Women (NOW), who “called for a nationwide boycott of 
all Vintage and Knopf books, with the exception of those by feminist authors” (O'Brien). 
Incidentally, by speaking out against the depictions of misogyny in the novel, reactionaries became 
                                   
1In an article adapted from an interview with Bret Easton Ellis that was published in The New York Times 
shortly after American Psycho was published, Roger Cohen writes “Mr. Ellis said he had received 13 
anonymous death threats, including several with photographs of him in which his eyes have been poked out 
or an axe drawn through his face. 'It's a little dismaying,' [Ellis] commented. 'Bateman Is The Monster' [Ellis] 
went on: 'Bateman is a misogynist. In fact, he's beyond that, he is just barbarous. But I think most Americans 
learn in junior high to differentiate between the writer and the character he is writing about. People seem to 
insist I'm a monster. Bateman is the monster. I am not on the side of that creep'” (qtd. in Cohen). 
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somewhat responsible for generating a spike in publicity for the novel, leading a long list of 
periodicals and journals, including the New York Times, the Washington Post, Vanity Fair, Rolling 
Stone, the Nation, Commentary and New Statesman & Society, to publish reactions, many of which 
were written by well-known writers and commentators such as Norman Mailer, Fay Weldon, Roger 
Rosenblatt and George Will. 
 
Ellis's depictions of ultra-violence in a misogynistic context debuted a flagrant disregard for the 
conventions and limits of Westernized political correctness, which may be deemed forgivable 
offenses, particularly in the realm of artistic practices if the work can be shown to have the merit 
warranting such an offense. Writing fifteen years after the novel's publication, Donna Lee Brien 
recalls that the book was “almost universally vilified and denigrated by the critical establishment. 
The work was criticized on both moral and aesthetic/literary/artistic grounds; that is, in terms of 
both what Ellis wrote and how he wrote it” (Brien). Political commentator and critic Naomi Wolf 
addressed the novel's failure on both grounds more acutely than many of her fellow commentators 
who denounced the novel. Wolf perceived the problem of its immorality, not so much in terms of 
obscenity, which was a common accusation, but more effectually as a “violation […] of women's 
civil rights, insofar as it results in conditioning male sexual response to female suffering or 
degradation” (Wolf 34). Wolf's metaphor, describing Ellis as “a maladjusted 11-year-old draw[ing] 
on his desk,” reflects a widely-held opinion that the novel is a product of an underdeveloped writer. 
(Wolf 34; cf. Lehmann-Haupt; Leo). While a majority of political and social commentators were 
unable to find any redeeming value that could justify overlooking its sadistic content, even “liberal 
'freedom of expression' intellectuals” generally refused to defend the text, reproaching the author 
for failing to provide an etiology or origin for the narrator's psychological illness (cf. Brien; C. 
Freccero). Ellis, in effect, alienated himself by refusing to adhere to socio-political conventions on 
the one hand and literary conventions on the other. 
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2. Theoretical Framework 
 
2.1. Introduction to Two Critical Approaches  
 
Today, with more than twenty years separating readers from American Psycho's debut, the 
interpreting lens produced by initial responses appears inadequate. Criticism has advanced beyond 
responding to the cries for censorship and has begun to build a tradition of literary critical analysis. 
What began as a populist and largely feminist critique shifted as scholars accepted the idea that the 
narrator's identity appears to be a construct reflecting the social-economic circumstance of an 
upper-class, financier at the global economic center of Wall Street in Manhattan at the height of 
advanced capitalism, rather than a mere reflection of Ellis's psyche. 
 
This thesis contends that the findings in recent criticism may be divided into two categories: one 
that is interested in what subjects (eg. the author, the novel, the narrator, character, et al.) are and 
another which is concerned with what subjects can do (cf. Ruffolo §10). In the following 
subsections specific criticism is referenced and shown to be motivated by these different 
perspectives. Importantly, each of these perspectives is discussed in relation to the differing social 
modes which is shown to inform them: specifically a Foucauldian disciplinary society and a 
Deleuzian society of control, respectively. 
 
By way of introducing the different consequences of these modes, this thesis turns to the critic Mark 
Storey's conclusion as an exemplary instance that involves both modes and, through a failure to 
account for their difference, arguably gives rise to an ethical concern. He writes: “In the nightmare 
world of American Psycho, Ellis critiques traditional masculinity in the most intense way possible, 
creating a character who, in his chaotic, hysterical perception of the world, lives out the final 
expression of a masculinity in its death throes” (71). Firstly, it should be noted that Storey conflates 
the disparate subjects of the author and the narrative. Ellis, the author-subject, can do something 
that the narrative-subject alone cannot do, that is “creat[e] a character” and “[critique] traditional 
masculinity.” What the “character” (i.e. the novel's first person narrator or the narrative-subject) can 
do, as Storey suggests, is offer “his chaotic, hysterical perception of the world.” While addressing 
the author, Storey reflects an interest in what the subject can do, yet in describing the character as 
“chaotic, hysterical” he expresses an interest in what the subject is. 
 
As a result of his conflating the two qualitatively different perspectives on the subject(s), an ethical 
concern arises. On one hand, by describing the narrative with an interest in what the it is, Storey, in 
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effect, renders the narrative-subject docile.2 On the other hand, the author's ability to do something, 
to “[critique] traditional masculinity,” becomes invested in the docile narrative-subject at the phrase 
“the final expression of a masculinity.” Reinvesting the narrative with the ability to do something 
disrupts its former docile state, enabling it to evidence a new meaning. In one sense, this is merely 
'interpretation,' but in another sense this is an 'imposition.' The ethical concern follows as readers 
who may have been previously inclined to read 'misogyny' may instead read: “the final expression 
of masculinity.” In other words, the absolute negative value associated with 'misogyny' is 
challenged, and at least partially displaced by the more positive term “masculinity,” which is 
shown, furthermore, in the positive light of its being an implicit critique of the traditionally 
oppressive character of masculinity. 
 
Importantly, an interest in what a subject can do allows for a subject to be conceived in terms of its 
own inherent capabilities. In contrast, an interest in what a subject is is succeeded by a conception 
of the subject that is constituted by a 'description' (or meaning and so forth) that is imposed on it. In 
the example provided, Storey implicitly conceives of the critic as the subject that can do something 
and what the critic does is render the text docile and impose a meaning on it. Given the absolute 
terms of the language in “what the subject is,” it should come as no surprise that findings in this 
strain of criticism are characteristically asserted with a relatively higher degree of certitude than the 
strain of criticism that follows an interest in what the subject can do: where this language seems to 
allow the subject a capacity of freedom, the limits of which are determined by its own capacity in 
relation to some recognized objective. In this light, this thesis echoes the sentiment of other critics 
in considering the criticism that is interested in what the subject is as issuing a form of violence: the 
narrator's “tendency to disembowel is contagious – just as he extracts organs from his victims, 
critics attempt to extract truth from the novel” (Serpell 64; cf. C. Freccero 52; Abel 142). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                   
2For a study of the docile subject see Michel Foucault's Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. 
Foucault maintains that the body, which is the subject of power, is docile. The docile body may be 
“subjected, used, transformed and improved” (136). 
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2.2. What the Subject Is 
 
2.2.1. Theory and Practice: Criticism with an Interest in What the Subject Is 
  
Amongst the varied critical approaches to the novel, the majority reflects an interest in what the 
subject is. Moreover, a significant number of critics representing this interest regularly evoke one of 
two frameworks: one positing American Psycho in the literary Gothic tradition (cf. Helyer; 
Söderlind; Cojocaru et al) and another that perceives it as a critique of the social conditions related 
to consumer capitalism (cf. Weinreich; Godden; Heise et al). Storey's examination of the novel as 
representative of masculinity in crisis does not fall in either of category, nevertheless, all of the 
critics mentioned below seem to be agreement with him when he writes “the form of the novel 
suggests that the central character is merely an illustration of a particular identity type” (60). Again, 
it should be noted that Storey invests the critic's ability to do something in the subjection of the 
docile text: it is not novel's form (what it is) that is able to illustrate a “particular identity type,” but 
rather the critic who is able to perceive this aspect in the novel. The critic's presence is betrayed by 
the word “merely,” which is a value judgment belonging to the critic, not the novel. 
 
The following is intended to the illustrate the quality of certitude that appears in criticism that, 
while involving different analytical frameworks, remains concerned with naming what Bateman is. 
In the Gothic strain of criticism, Ruth Helyer says that “Gothic characters are typically highly 
stereotyped and Patrick is no exception” (728); Daniel Cojocaru describes the central character as a 
mimetic construct, “imitat[ing] the very ideal of the 'Everyyuppie'” (187); and Sylvia Söderlind 
argues that “Patrick Bateman's only desire is to 'fit in'” (66). Turning to the discussions of the novel 
as a critique of consumer capitalism, Bateman's efforts reflecting a “desire to 'fit in'” to an exclusive 
yuppie identity are coupled with his violence, leading the critic Richard Godden to “[take] the 
financier Bateman's preferred activities, brand display, torture, and the serial liquefaction of 
'hardbodies' as quasi-allegorical representations of the working of finance capital during the Reagan 
presidency” (853). Thomas Heise has gone so far as to write that Bateman is “Ellis's fantasy of the 
quintessential neoliberal subject” (144). Eschewing the allegorical lenses of his predecessors, the 
critic Adam Szetala recalled the “lifestyle format,” pervasive in 1980s advertising, that transmuted 
“commodities [into] sign vehicles for status and personal identity” (37). Szetala explains that “[in] 
the lifestyle format” the meaning of signs are “always embedded within the social context of a 
'lifestyle group' [which is] structured by 'self-administered codes of authority for dress, appearance 
… customary places of assembly, and behavior rituals'” (37). As a result, Szetala argues, “Bateman 
has internalized the lifestyle appeal to such an extent that his entire sense of self is derived from the 
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exchange of pricey clothing and Wall Street business accounts, whose value as status signifiers and 
identity vehicles is defined by […] his lifestyle group” (emphasis added; 37).   
 
As the critics attempt to impose certain meanings on the subject, to effectively 'imprison' the subject 
within a framework of knowledge, the critical mode seems to act as a surrogate for the novel's 
absent juridical system. Since this thesis also approaches the narrator's identity through a 
framework of advertising, Szetala's conclusion appears to be the most relevant while also being 
representative of these critics' conclusive posturing – problematized by the narrator's unreliability, 
critics often resort to paraphrasis to muster certitude: “As a writer, Ellis offers his readers no 
alternative to Bateman’s ad-induced conception of the world; he simply provides a symptom – 
violence – without a cure” (43). It could be argued that the absence of a “cure,” a metaphor for an 
effective juridical and prison system, precipitates the critics' interest in the what the subject is. 
 
The critical mode interested in what the subject is inherits its approach from what is widely 
recognized as a disciplinary society. The eruption of disciplinary practices has a vastly complex 
history involving profound social effects that appear to result from such rearrangements in political 
and economic structures as the rise of scientific rationality (eg. The Enlightenment) against a 
background of declining sovereign dominance; the rise in the factory system as the dominant mode 
of production (eg. Industrial Revolution; Taylorism) effecting the demise of the domestic system of 
manufacturing; and the “calculable man,” known through measured assessments of his activities in 
relation to 'norms,' displacing the “memorable man” whose status is inherited through ancestral 
lineage (O'Neil 53). 
 
Beginning with Karl Marx's interest in the “rise of factory discipline,” major theorists such as Max 
Weber, Louis Althusser and Michel Foucault have produced significant conceptualizations of 
modern disciplinary power, which may be thought of as responses to the question: “what are the 
techniques by which man has subjected himself to the rational discipline of the applied human 
sciences (law, medicine, economics, education and administration)?” (O'Neil 42). One concise and 
valuable response is provided by Antonio Negri's and Michael Hardt's summary of a Foucauldian 
disciplinary society as: 
a diffuse network of dispositifs or apparatuses that produce and regulate customs, habits, and 
productive practices. Putting this society to work and ensuring obedience to its rule and its 
mechanisms of inclusion and/or exclusion are accomplished though the disciplinary 
institutions (the prison, the factory, the asylum, the hospital, the university, the school and 
so forth) that structure the social terrain and present logics adequate to the “reason” of 
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discipline. Disciplinary power rules in effect by structuring the parameters and limits of 
thought and practice, sanctioning and prescribing normal and/or deviant behaviors. Foucault 
generally refers to the ancien régime and the classical age of French civilization to illustrate 
the emergence of disciplinarity, but more generally we could say that the entire first phase of 
capitalist accumulation (in Europe and elsewhere) was conducted under this paradigm of 
power. (23)3 
The absence of an effective juridical and carceral system (ie. the prison) in American Psycho is 
particularly significant since the novel's renown – or rather, infamy – is largely founded on its 
depictions of ultraviolence and other forms of deviancy: in terms of ethics, morality, legality, 
political correctness, etc., see instances of racism (5; 36; 125; 185 … ), drug use (125; 180; 234 …), 
misogyny (41; 57; 65; 74 … ) narcissism (10; 56; 65; 147 … ). Further investigation of the novel 
discovers that references to traditional institutions are few and where they do appear, they appear 
completely incapable of reproducing disciplinary power. There are references to the narrator having 
attended a school, specifically Harvard (196, 215, 216 …). However the school seems to have little 
or no impact on his present circumstance other than enabling the narrator to represent a specific 
period of past time. He is occasionally 'at work,' yet is never depicted as 'performing work' (60, 72, 
100, 133 … ), nor is he the subject of any of the disciplinary measures typically found in a 
workplace (eg. time-clock, scheduling, task-reward system, supervision, etc.). His mother resides in 
a private room at “Sandstone” – a recognizable metaphor of mortality as a sign for material found in 
a structure prone to erosion and appropriated for measurement in an hourglass – a long-term care 
facility that is distinctly not a hospital and she does not appear to be receiving any treatment against 
disease (341). Bateman apparently commits murder (112; 114; 124; 154; et al) and confesses (330; 
362), yet is never imprisoned. The notable absence of disciplinary institutions in the novel provides 
the cue for this thesis to discover a different, more relevant system for reproducing values. 
 
 
                                   
3For an early, hypothetical explanation of how the apparatuses of disciplinary institutions become a “diffuse 
network” see Foucault's “Of Other Spaces” (“Des Espace Autres” 1967) wherein he coins and describes the 
term heterotopias as “privileged or sacred or forbidden places, reserved for individuals who are, in relation 
to society and to the human environment in which they live, in a state of crisis” (4). In the section titled “The 
swarming of disciplinary mechanisms” of his Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, Foucault 
recasts and more concretely discusses this earlier term, heterotopias. As “the disciplinary establishments 
increase, their mechanisms have a certain tendency to become 'de-institutionalized', to emerge from the 
closed fortresses in which they once functioned and to circulate in a 'free' state; the massive, compact 
disciplines are broken down into flexible methods of control, which may be transferred and adapted.” As an 
illustration, Foucault offers the early Christian school, which did not restrict their “train[ing]” to the students 
enrolled in the school: “the bad behavior of the child, or his absence, is a legitimate pretext […] for [the 
school's administrators] to question the neighbors [and] the parents themselves, to find out whether they 
know their catechism and the prayers, whether they are determined to root out the vices of their children, 
how many beds are in the house and what the sleeping arrangements are […]” (211). 
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2.2.2. Biopower of Communications and Advertising 
 
Gilles Deleuze published “Postscript on the Societies of Control” (hereafter “Postscript”) in Paris in 
1990: the same year Bret Easton Ellis, living and writing in New York City, submitted the 
manuscript for American Psycho. In terms of their shared historicity, the temporal proximity 
between the philosophical and fictional publications is significant, but no less so than the 
experiences of the common social forces in their respective geographical locations. In “Postscript” 
Deleuze proposes to construct a History, Logic and Program that follows the circumstance where 
traditional institutions have lost their power: 
We are in a generalized crisis in relation to all the environments of enclosure – prison, 
hospital, factory, school, family. The family is an 'interior' in crisis like all other interiors – 
scholarly, professional, etc. The administration in charge never cease announcing 
supposedly necessary reforms […] But everyone knows that these institutions are finished, 
whatever the length of their expiration periods. (4) 
In the short essay, Deleuze offers considerable speculation on how the effects of the new forces of 
“control” differ from the effects of discipline. While elements of his text related to communication 
are presented here, the concept is formally introduced in a later section (“What a Subject Can Do”) 
and illustrated through a brief discussion on the “Algebra of Need,” a concept in William S. 
Burroughs's Naked Lunch, the writer whom Deleuze credits for coining the term “control” 
(“Postscript” 4).   
 
Subjects of a society framed by the geography of major, western metropolises at the height of 
advanced capitalism, such as Paris and New York, are compelled to internalize a model of 
production, which has succeeded that of the factory and is explored by both Deleuze's philosophical 
essay and Ellis's novel. Their respective environments of Paris and New York are considerably 
saturated in aural and visual communication designed to target subjects, namely consumers. The 
fact that American Psycho is so thoroughly-saturated with references to forms of communications 
on the diegetic level (newspapers, magazines, posters, labels, signs, films, books, music, artworks, 
etc.) is likely what led the critic Thomas Heise to describe the novel as “nothing more than a 
pastiche of discourses spoken without affect, a Barthesian tissue of quotations from advertising” 
(emphasis added; 151). Moreover it is significant that in most cases these communications have 
been appropriated from the communications industries in the 'real world' (i.e. Zagat's, Armani, New 
York Post, Les Misérables, etc.): a factor that has likely contributed to the perceivable veracity of 
the paratext appearing on the back cover of the Vintage edition which describes the novel as 
representing “a world … recognizably our own.” 
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Contrary to what Heise suggests, the discourses of advertisement messaging must be considered in 
their affective character. The American historian, David M. Potter commented that in order to 
understand modern popular writers one must understand advertising, just as one must understand 
the cult of chivalry to understand a medieval troubadour or evangelical religion to understand a 
nineteenth century revivalist (Bell 68). In an interview with Deleuze, published shortly before 
“Postscript,” Negri prefaces a question by recalling his attention to a series of pleas he had made for 
analysts to “look in more detail at three kinds of power: sovereign power, disciplinary power, and 
above all the control of 'communication' [...]” Deleuze responds: “We're definitely moving toward 
'control' societies that are no longer exactly disciplinary. […] that no longer operate by confining 
people but through continuous control and instant communication” (Deleuze Negotiations 174). 
Within months, Deleuze publishes “Postscript,” specifically targeting corporate advertising: 
[I]n the present situation, capitalism is no longer involved in production, which it often 
relegates to the Third World […] it buys the finished products or assembles parts. What it 
wants to sell is services and what it wants to buy are stocks. This is no longer a capitalism 
for production but for the product, which is to say, for being sold or marketed. […] 
Marketing has become the center or [« âme »] of the corporation. We are taught that 
corporations have a soul, which is the most terrifying news in the world. (5-7) 
Following Deleuze's concern, Negri and Hardt, theorists who collaborated with Deleuze in 
developing the concepts of control societies, emphasize the importance of considering the 
production of social order through analyses of “language, communication and the symbolic that are 
developed by communications industries” (32). More recently David V. Ruffolo, echoing the 
concern Deleuze raised in his interview with Negri, conceives of the emerging control of “bodies 
through the flows of communication and information” (Ruffolo §4). The adequacy of the novel 
form, in terms representing the flows of both visual (sign) and aural (verbal) communication, finds 
its preeminence in the language technology of American Psycho: “language technology” being a 
reference to the features of the ontological language discussed above, wielded as a tool. 
 
It could be argued that the contemporary communications industries, specifically, marketing 
departments and advertising agencies, subjectivate the notion of 'identity,' transforming it into 
vehicular biopower4 to carry the load of its message, driving and qualifying it further than the limits 
of its original source material (word-of-mouth gone viral). Hardt and Negri conceive the 
                                   
4Biopower is a term coined by Focuault. For his discussion see History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An 
Introduction. 
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contemporary post-disciplinary biopolitical context as a society that has fully realized itself as the 
“realm of biopower,” a term they define as: 
the form of power that regulates social life from its interior, following it, interpreting it, 
absorbing it, and rearticulating it. Power can achieve an effective command over the entire 
life of the population only when it becomes an integral, vital function that every individual 
embraces and reactivates of his or her own accord. (24) 
The disciplinary institutions, with their relatively closed spaces and logic (including ethics and 
naming), constantly produce the occasion for resistance and thus fail “to reach the point of 
permeating entirely the consciousnesses and bodies of individuals, the point of treating and 
organizing them in the totality of their activities” (24). 
 
In giving voices to brand name commodities from shampoo to shoes, from celebrities to political 
policies, the communications industries fashion Patrick Bateman as their subject: his 'identity' 
belongs to the realm of biopower. For example, the early chapter titled “Morning” is ostensibly an 
introduction to the setting of the narrator's apartment and morning routine, but appears, essentially, 
as a list of brand name high-tech entertainment equipment (Toshiba, NEC, Wurlitzer, Baldwin, 
Sansui, Duntech, et al) followed by a series of marketing appeals or corporate value propositions 
related to hygiene products: 
Then I use the Probright tooth polisher and next the Interplak tooth polisher (this in addition 
to the toothbrush) which has a speed of 4200 rpm and reverses direction forty-six times per 
second […] first a water-activated gel cleanser, then a honey-almond body scrubm and on 
the face an exfoliating gel scrub. Vidal Sassoon shampoo is especially good at getting rid of 
the coating of dried perspiration, salts, oils, airborne pollutants […]  (23-24) 
 
The novel's relationship to advertising could not be more essential in terms of the relational 
framework that involves the narrator as the subject of communication and subsequently, the novel 
as vehicle to communicate the advertising message. While the term 'communication,' is 
conspicuously absent from “Postscript,” its concepts appear prevalently throughout in two forms: 
describing the position of the subject and the mode of subjectivation. In other words, appearing as a 
language sign in the novel, Bateman is literally rendered as the subject of the flow of 
communication, perpetually in transit (or in a state of transition) between two positions without 
having actually departed from one position nor with the possibility of actually arriving at the 
subsequent position. While significant critical attention has been paid to the novel's last words, 
THIS IS NOT AN EXIT –  in both relying on and refuting its allusion to Jean-Paul Sartre's No Exit 
– like many of the questions raised by the text, it remains unresolved. Although, considering the 
 14 
flows of communication (i.e. the discourses of advertising, literary theory and philosophy) that enter 
the novel, along with the subjectivation of the reader, these final words could arguably be 
considered as an indication that the novel has only provided a temporary modulation in the 
subjectivation of the reader who is otherwise, in continuous flow of communication and 
information in the 'real world.' 
 
 
2.2.3. Contingency of Values in Advertising and the Literary Work 
 
American Psycho acts as a vehicle, echoing the model of advertising and representing advertising's 
values, virtually without any qualification by the novel's intermediary, the narrator. In effect, the 
reader of literature is transformed into the subject of advertising. Bateman's identity – like subject 
of 'identities' for literary analysis in general – is essentially assessed through a qualitative analysis 
of his relations with other objects in the narrative. Bateman appears to others in the story as a 
model-type. The narrator uses the term “model type” (39; 58) to describe women, while 'others' in 
the text perceive him as a “model” (“an old queer,” 153; “the young faggot,” 165; and an English 
girl, 191) and on one occasion, when a taxi driver recognizes him from somewhere, the narrator 
suggests that he is recognizable, being “[a] model” (364). In being perceived as a “model type,” the 
presence of his figure in relation to commodities lends credibility to the perception of these scenes 
as representations of advertisements: the natural habitat of the model. 
 
In the following exemplary, yet representative, excerpt, Bateman exhibits the significance of 
physical appearance: rendered in the details of exercise routine, the details of dress-code and his 
consideration of how he will appear in relation to his date. 
a hundred and fifty push-ups, and then I run in place for twenty minutes while listening to 
the new Huey Lewis CD. I take a hot shower and afterwards use a new facial scrub by 
Caswell-Massey and a body wash by Greune, then a body moisturizer by Lubriderm and a 
Neutrogena facial cream. I debate between two outfits. One is a wool-crepe suit by Bill 
Robinson I bought at Saks with this cotton jacquard shirt from Charivari and an Armani tie. 
Or a wool and cashmere sport coat with blue plaid, a cotton shirt and pleated wool trousers 
by Alexander Julian, with a polka-dot tie by Bill Blass. The Julian might be a little too warm 
for May but if Patricia's wearing this outfit by Karl Lagerfeld that I think she's going to, then 
maybe I will go with the Julian, because it would go well with her suit. The shoes are 
crocodile loafers by A. Testoni. (72)   
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While exercise and dress code reflect his appearance as a model, the consideration given to his date, 
demonstrates his interest in composition, the process where values are transposed through relations, 
in associations, on the basis of contingency. The name brand, designer clothing in Bateman's 
wardrobe represent products whose value is not found in relation to the cost of raw materials. 
Rather, brand names, similar to character names, represent conceptual, abstract values that vary 
relative to how they are perceived by their subject. Attaching an Armani label to a jacket increases 
its perceivable value, which, in effect increases the cost of consumer acquisition, but only if the 
consumer is aware that the name Armani is capable of doing that: otherwise, the jacket is merely a 
jacket. 
 
Importantly, through the interest he shows toward his own appearance, particularly in terms of his 
seemingly excessive physical fitness routine and his strict fashion code, the reader-subject (in 
relation to Bateman's 'identity') and the advertisement-subject (in relation to Bateman as a model-
type) may ascertain a notion of the conceptual values that are attached to the brand names. As is 
common in advertisements that include human models, the values of these brand names are 
contingent upon their relation to Bateman as an emulative model-type: an identity with an excessive 
interest in maintaining personal health and judgment guided by a strict code. The advertised 
message 'reads,' if you think of yourself as someone interested in good health and good judgment, 
listen to “the new Huey Lewis CD.” 
 
If the excerpt above may be considered as an instance of advertising assemblage – a text "built 
primarily and explicitly from existing texts to solve a writing or communication problem in a new 
context" (Selber and Johnson 381) – the novel's repeated instantiations of names may be considered 
as a serial advertising. Consider that Victor Hugo's Les Misérables, the then-current, Broadway 
performance is mentioned eighteen times in the novel attached to various comunicative media 
represented in the diegesis: on posters (3, 108, 116, 141); in dialogue (80, 116, 168, 229, 262); in 
reference to its soundtrack (89, 110, 129, 147, 158, 168, 204, 327); its playbill (121, 212, 229). The 
first two instances where Les Misérables are found in the novel are exemplary in their introduction 
of advertising's presence in the novel as an element within the flow of communication. The absence 
of the play's performance in the novel's diegesis reflects the logic of advertising which only appear 
on the basis of their object's absence and its appearance in name only follows the advertising's aim 
to appear by interrupting, disrupting or obstructing vision. Posters communicating Les Misérables 
appear on the sides of buses, presumably filled with commuters, to interrupt Price's vision of a sign 
criticizing capitalism and in the second instance, to obstruct a question uttered by Price, which 
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effectively transmutes what the narrator hears Price say: becoming question that lends support to the 
capitalist critique. The first instance occurs within the action of the novel's first sentence: 
ABANDON ALL HOPE YE WHO ENTER HERE is scrawled in blood red lettering on the 
side of the Chemical Bank near Eleventh and First and is in print large enough to be seen 
from the backseat of the cab as it lurches forward in the traffic leaving Wall Street and just 
as Timothy Price notices the words, a bus pulls up, the advertisement for Les Misérables on 
its side blocking his view […] (3) 
This leaves the reader to suppose that Price is not allowed the time to read John Ciardi's translation 
of Dante's words, while the privilege of the reader to revisit them as often as wished remains. The 
particular significance of this effect in relation to the reader is discussed in a section below 
(“Corporeal Vision of Inferno and American Psycho”). 
 
In the following paragraph, “Les Misérables,” appears again: explicitly qualified by serialization, 
found in terms of plain repetition (eg. the word “another” in “another bus”; “another poster”) and in 
representational media (eg. “[l]ike in a movie”; “another poster”). Significantly, the lines of 
communication in the pair of sentences – between words in terms of syntax, between characters in 
the scene, between the text and the analysis – revolve around the word “money,” the preeminent 
representation of value. Timothy Price asks: 
“I mean am I alone in thinking we're not making enough money?” Like in a movie another 
bus appears, another poster for Les Misérables replaces the word – not the same bus because 
someone has written the word DYKE over Eponine's face. (emphasis added; 3) 
In terms of syntax, “word” seems to refer to the last word in the previous sentence: “money?” (3): 
conflating Les Misérables with absence of money. Considering Price's question without this last 
word, transforms the object in question. In its entirety, Price's personal concern reflects capitalism's 
fundamental concern: the production of money; Price's cab is leaving the epicenter of advanced 
capitalism, Wall St. Without “money,” the narrator hears “am I alone in thinking we're not making 
enough[?]”: an implicit allusion to a factory system of production which, recalling Deleuze, is 
“often relegate[d] to the Third World” (“Postscript” 5). 
 
In a sense, the narrator literally hears the 'object' of “Price” without the term of 'money,' which may 
be considered in relation to the novel's first sentence. Dante's phrase, inscribed with a severe sense 
of foreboding on the gates of hell becomes appropriated in the novel by a graffiti artist, attaching a 
similar sense of foreboding to the private banking system: financing its operations through 
capitalization; money producing money. It might be suggested that the graffiti artist's concern is 
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explicitly heard in the voice of Price by the narrator: “am I alone in thinking we're not making 
enough[?]” material goods. 
 
Ascertaining the meaning of the graffiti artist's critique of capitalism is problematized by its 
appearance in a criminal, deviant act. From a discipline perspective, the deviant graffiti is 
problematic insofar as it reflects a perspective outside, not reproducing traditional codes of law and 
capitalist economics. However, Price is arguably capitalism's biggest proponent in the novel: 
representing the fully-disciplined, “perfectly normalized being,” the “ABNORMAL individual 
today” (Baudrillard 67). The text may be considered as recovering a critique of the dominant 
economic system present in the novel as this character of Price is heard, giving voice to the concern 
in the artist's critique of capitalism. Significantly, the relationship between the graffiti and Price's 
voice has not been noted in the criticism: this fact credits Ellis's accomplishment in his allusion to 
Dante as is discussed in the later section “Corporeal Vision of Inferno and American Psycho.” 
 
Not only does this value – attributed to an object as the result of its relation to other elements in a 
composition – reflect the value assigned to name brands in advertisements (as discussed above), it 
furthermore reflects the notion of value “relate[d] to floating rates of exchange” (Deleuze 
“Postscript” 5). Deleuze explains: 
Perhaps it is money that expresses the distinction between the two societies [i.e. discipline 
with its factories and control with its corporations] best, since discipline always referred 
back to minted money that locks gold in as numerical standard, while control relates to 
floating rates of exchange, modulated according to a rate established by a set of standard 
currencies. (“Postscript” 5) 
Economic values that are arrived at through processes involved in “floating rates of exchange” –  as 
opposed to a numerical value related to gold – may find a parallel process involved in the 
assignment of meaning to the novel's language here, suggesting, in other words, that the text is 
hermetic, self-referential.  In other words, the meaning of Dante's text is shown to maintain a 
particular floating value (an immanent meaning) despite its having been detached from its origin: a 
value or meaning that may be applied elsewhere to other objects, such as the banking system and as 
the opening line appearing American Psycho. 
 
Attributing values or meanings according to the system of “floating rates of exchange” put the 
original value or meaning at risk of reappearing in a circumstance that does not allow it to regain 
the value that it had as it was attached to the original. Specifically, Dante's text, reproduced in the 
deviant act of a criminal – from the perspective of a “normalized being” –  appears to be valued by 
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a lower rate of exchange than, for instance, the headlines from USA Today which Price 
enthusiastically reads aloud in the backseat of the taxi: “in one issue – let's see here... strangled 
models, babies thrown from tenement rooftops, kids killed in the subway, a Communist rally, Mafia 
boss wiped out, Nazis'” (5). In contrast to Dante's text, many of the meanings or values alluded to in 
these headlines remain “floating”: the significance that Price, alone, seems to attribute to them are 
not supported in a relation to another aspect of the text. Readers do not encounter a Communist 
rally or Nazis explicitly in any other place in the novel. However, “kids killed in the subway,” for 
instance, gains significance in its relation to an explicit echo one hundred pages later when the 
narrator says, “'All I can think about is this poster I saw in the subway station the other night before 
I killed those two black kids […]” (114). In a similar way, as the concern implied in the graffiti is 
heard to echo in the voice of a one of the novel's more significant characters, it gains a value in 
excess of the significance awarded to it in its first appearance, prior to a hermeneutic reading. That 
said, when significance is shown to be contingent – the values of signs are determined through their 
relation to other signs – the sign is at risk of appearing to have no significance, yet the reverse is 
also true: appearing in particularly value-laden relations, a sign may also be awarded a significance 
of exponentially greater value than the meaning originally attributed to it. 
  
The excerpt is not only involved in an economic discourse. For instance, it also illustrates a 
particular hierarchy in the realm of representative media. Recalling that “word” in the excerpt above 
refers to money in a vocal or voiced form suggests that the visual appearance of language as a sign 
has the capacity to “replace” its verbal appearance as orally reproduced: reflective of the act of 
silently reading, likewise the transformation of oral cultures through chirography. The sentence that 
immediately follows further distinguishes what might be considered the novel's visual hierarchy: 
“DYKE,” a visual sign in language literally appears “over,” while certainly qualifying the visual 
image of “Eponine's face” (3). 
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2.3. Toward an Ontology of Language 
 
Marking the distinction between the realms of praxis (of the apparatus of language) and of ontology 
is particularly relevant in conceiving the notion of identity in works of literature, and perhaps even 
more so when charges related to superficiality are leveled against the literary character, as in the 
case of American Psycho. This thesis attempts an analysis that considers identity as a value-laden 
subject that offers the opportunity for language to 'exist' and in this section considers, what might be 
called, the ontological aspects of language. In other words, it accepts the charge that the novel is 
“nothing more than a pastiche of discourses” (Heise 151) and attempts to 'pull open' (this thesis's 
suggested homonym of “Paul Owen”) various discourses in an effort to expose the potentialities 
and limitations in the figures and characteristics of the novel's language: an approach unburdened of 
the tasks assigned by literary conventions associated with realism and portrayals of human 
character. 
 
In general terms, recalling Walter J. Ong, “names do give human beings power over what they 
name” (33)5. If, in naming Patrick Bateman “the very ideal of the 'Everyyuppie'” (Cojocaru 187) or 
“the quintessential neoliberal subject” (Heise 144) these critics betray an interest in wielding power, 
it should be carefully considered in its positive character, which is a notion that marks their act in 
language as being in a distinctly separate realm from that of the critic's being. Positivity is: 
the name that, according to [Jean] Hyppolite [Foucault's teacher in the Lycée Henri-IV, 
whom he occasionally refers to as “my master”], the young Hegel gives to the historical 
element – loaded as it is with rules, rites, and institutions that are imposed on the individual 
by an external power, but that become, so to speak internalized in the systems of beliefs and 
feelings (Agamben 4-6). 
Foucault inherits this term, positivity, only to recast it as his “apparatus,” which, according to 
Giorgio Agamben, Foucault fails to adequately define (cf. Agamben 1,6). The broad category of the 
apparatus, inclusive of naming – and, moreover, of language – Agamben defines as “literally 
anything that has the capacity to capture, orient, determine, intercept, model, control, or secure the 
gestures, behaviors, opinions of discourses of living beings” (Agamben 14). Commonly, 
apparatuses are considered to be wielded as tools by individuals or organizations, as is argued, in a 
                                   
5It has been noted that Ong is primarily discussing the power of naming in a context of orality, though he 
does explicitly suggest that the same holds true in chirographic and typographic contexts (cf. 33). Also, note 
that Ong evidently considers 'power' to be something like a substance, a notion which is not shared by 
Foucault who considers power to be a relation (cf. Allen 49). However, as discussed below (see, in particular 
the section discussing “Access”) Ong's conceptualization of “naming” as it relates to information that 
provides power or access, it may be said that it regains materiality in the context of a control society (cf. 
Ruffolo §9). 
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realm other than that of their being. Insofar as criticism is interested in what the subject is – an 
interest that leads to the imposition of names – the critical apparatus implicitly betray the critics' 
having internalized discipline's logic of enclosure, a conceptual representation of the physical walls 
of institutions: marking their criticism as a reproduction of disciplinary power, rather than the 
individual critic's power. The reproduction of disciplinary power has a direct effect on the structure 
of analysis which appears to be “[p]utting this [text] to work and ensuring obedience to [the 
analyst's] rule” (Hardt and Negri 23), or the critic's hypothesis. In a sense, the disciplined individual 
offers a significant precedent for conceiving language the potential realm of the being of language.  
Insofar as the disciplined individual appears with a logic structured by interiorized discipline and 
reproduce the mechanism in the realm of praxis, language, with its intertextual referentiality may 
suggestively offer a parallel conceptualization. 
 
In tracing the etymology of “dispositif” (Foucault's original French; apparatus, English) through 
dispositio (Latin) to oikonomia (Greek), Agamben uncovers how the apparatuses appear as 
phenomona detached from the ontological realm of the human being in the Judeo-Christian, 
Western civilization. Facing public concerns that the Trinity (Father, Son and Holy Spirit) 
introduces polytheism and paganism into Christianity, the “monarchians” (theologians interested in 
preserving the monotheistic aspect) issued a response, which Agamben paraphrases: 
“God, insofar as his being and substance is concerned is certainly one; but as to his 
oikonomia – that is to say the way in which he administers his home, his life, and the world 
he created – he is rather triple. Just as a good father can entrust to his son the execution of 
certain functions and duties without in so doing losing his power and his unity, so God 
entrusts to Christ the 'economy,' the administration and government of human history” 
(Agamben 9-10). 
This had the effect of producing the conceptualization of action as detached from being: “the 
schizophrenia that the theological doctrine of oikonomia has left as its legacy to Western 
civilization” (Agamben 10).   
 
More recently, the shift from manufacturing to capitalization, from the factory to the corporation 
represents a process of disenchantment in the modes of production. In early modernity, 
enlightenment thinking and scientific advancements produced the notion that enchanted values, 
which could be perceived as theology's value system, are irrational and that science held the key to 
replacing them with values of a character that could be “rationally understood and technically 
controlled” (Rosner 17). Though this perspective would lead to modernity's technological 
advancements and economic prosperity (the diegetic world enjoyed by the narrator of American 
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Psycho), these elements would appear essentially to be emptied of the meaning that for centuries 
enchanted objects in the world. 
 
Reflecting on the effect of this, which Charles Taylor calls the Malaise of Modernity, he writes: 
“Some people sense a terrible flatness ... identified particularly with commercial, industrial, or 
consumer society. They feel emptiness in the repeated, accelerating cycle of desire and 
fulfillment in consumer culture; the cardboard quality of bright supermarkets, or neat row 
housing in a clean suburb” (qtd. in Rosner, p.18). The character of this view of the world appears 
reflected in the novel's, perhaps, most commonly cited phrase “surface surface surface” (323), 
which alternatively appears as “Surface, surface, surface” (350). The former appears in the larger 
context of “surface surface surface, a Rolls is a Rolls is a Rolls” (323) has been, in all likelihood, 
correctly associated with Gertrude Stein's famous line, Rose is a rose is a rose while simultaneously 
alluding to the elite, albeit, 'mass produced' consumer commodity of the Rolls Royce, and hopefully 
less to the notion that readers “roll along the surface of [Ellis's] language” (Serpell 60). Also, the 
latter repetition seems to be qualified, if not voiced by Stein's Modernist contemporary, Ernest 
Hemingway: “Surface, surface, surface was all that anyone found meaning in ... this was 
civilization as I saw it, colossal and jagged...” (350). 
 
Significantly, the invocation of Stein and her particular Modernist aesthetic, alight the language 
with the potential of irreferentiality: of words in a state of detachment from external references, 
textual independence, existing for their own sake: of a Rolls in relation to a Rolls in relation to a 
Rolls. This circumstance, where the appearance of one object is qualified (or finds its value) 
through its relation to surrounding objects, the series of “a Rolls is a Rolls is a Rolls” emphatically 
recalls the discussion in the previous section regarding the values of appearance derived from 
advertising. As the previous section illustrated, as the narrator describes the process of selecting the 
outfit he would wear on his date with Patricia, he implicitly suggests that there is no difference 
between the suit by Bill Robinson or the one by Alexander Julian other than the fact that “the 
Julian” will appear to be complimented by the Karl Lagerfeld, which he assumes Patricia will wear 
(72). As the outfits may be perceived as interchangeable as each the “Rolls” in the series, the series 
“a Rolls is a Rolls is a Rolls” could similarly be rendered as a Robinson is a Julian is a Lagerfeld. 
Given all of the brand names that appear as interchangeable in the novel the distinct quality of 
“Rolls” as a homonym of rose supports the lending interpretations the significance of Stein's notion 
of irreferentiality. 
 
 22 
Contingent on the allusion to Hemingway suggests reading the first fragment as an intentionally 
simplistic interpretation, what you see is what you get, while the concluding fragment contributes an 
unseen character. The term “colossal” signifies as an overwhelming mass – suggesting a quality in 
excess of comprehension. The big picture perspective suggested by “colossal” is followed by 
“jagged,” which is a description that lends the detail of a local perspective to a surface, which 
appears nuanced as opposed to uniform. Still the inability to fully comprehend is reinforced, as the 
term “jagged” describes something that is apparently rough, raw, or undefined. It also implies an 
alternation between light and shadow, between aspects that appear elevated at the crest of a jagged 
peak along with aspects that remain in the shadow of the troughs between. Collectively, these 
attributes arguably describe an iceberg. 
 
Hemingway's well-known Iceberg Theory, which is also known as the theory of omission, is 
conceptualized in his Death in the Afternoon: “If a writer of prose knows enough of what he is 
writing about he may omit things that he knows and the reader, if the writer is writing truly enough, 
will have a feeling of those things as strongly as though the writer had stated them. The dignity of 
movement of an ice-berg is due to only one-eighth of it being above water. A writer who omits 
things because he does not know them only makes hollow places in his writing.” By omitting 
elements of the story, as Hemingway's theory allows, a line of communication may be opened 
between the author and the reader's intuitive aspect of vision. 
 
The intuitive aspect of vision may be illustrated in reference to the novel's internal conception of 
brand names. Of the many potential metaphors afforded by the concept of an iceberg in relation to 
the “surface,” surface may plausibly refer to both the surface of the water surrounding the iceberg 
and the surface of the iceberg. As water, the analogy suggests a surface with certain depth – that is, 
a sufficient appearance but in a state of equilibrium (i.e. sea level) and this appears in relation to the 
object of the iceberg. Considering the surface of brand names and with Bateman dressed in brand 
name clothing as the iceberg, it follows that 'Bateman' must appear above the 'brand name's 
appearance in order to give the 'brand name' a relative point by which its value may be measured. 
The analogy implies that if a brand name appears too often – the surface raises above the iceberg – 
it loses its contingency and disappears. 
 
Where both Stein and Hemingway appear following essentially the same series of signs, the 
language of American Psycho implicates itself as being equally informed by both Stein's 
irrefentiality – or the novel's hermetic system for producing significance, particularly evident in its 
excessive use of brand names whose values are contingent on the bases of their appearance – and 
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Hemingway's theory of omission. This may suggest that historical knowledge, recorded in the 
visual language of signs – Ferdinand de Saussure's langue which parallels the conceptualization of 
the perfectly disciplined subject – has virtually assumed the place of the 'author,' where it is found 
in relation to Hemingway's theory of omission, in the language of the novel. It follows that the 
aspects of the novel appearing to be qualified by unrecoverable uncertainty actually reflect the 
limits of historical knowledge, such as the question of life-after-death. 
 
Before considering the phrase 'pull open' as an immanent aspect of the language in the novel that 
gives direction to the analytical apparatus, its appearance as a homonym of the novel's important 
character “Paul Owen” must be qualified. Both the presence of homonyms in the novel, as well as 
the character's importance have been well-documented in the criticism (cf. Cocojaru; Serpell; 
Szetala et al), though none have suggested this pun, which requires a slight modulation in the verbal 
pronunciation of the Paul Owen's name to discover the directive, pull open. The appearance of both 
words, “pull” and “open”(2), within the narrative sequence of his murder lends textual support for 
the reading of Paul Owen's name as a homonym for pull open:   
The ax hits him midsentence, straight in the face, its thick blade chopping him sideways into 
his open mouth, shutting him up. Paul's eyes look up at me, then involuntarily roll back into 
his head, then back at me […] I pull the ax out – almost yanking Owen out of the chair by 
his head – and strike him again in the face, splitting it open [...] (emphasis added; 203) 
The fact that the direction appears embedded within the sign for an identity suggests a specific 
series of correlative concepts: vocal and visual languages; identity and performativity; and, perhaps, 
being and praxis. 
 
Furthermore, it may be argued that the direction's object, what the language suggests as the object 
to be pulled open, is arguably the ontology of language, and not the concept of character or identity. 
A close reading of the excerpt reveals that Owen's mouth and face are opened, but it was the tool 
that was pulled. Conceiving of language as a tool, and considering that the tool, “the ax,” is is the 
object that is pulled in the text, may plausibly suggest that language is the object to be pulled open. 
Additionally, the fact that “[t]he ax hits him midsentence […] into his open mouth” reflects the 
novel's prioritization of visual representations of language over vocalized language. The hierarchy 
is not only inherent to the novel's form in general and expressed through the appearance of the sign 
for name “Paul Owen” rather than vocal directive derived therefrom, it is, moreover, shown to be 
rather explicitly illustrated on the novel's first page, as discussed in a later section of this thesis. 
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Other interpretations leading to the object of the directive pull open seem significantly less 
plausible. Firstly, the capacity for the analyst to pull open Paul Owen's identity is remarkably 
limited. Despite his name appearing in excess of one hundred fifty times, Owen utters a mere 
twenty or so lines – none of which seem to reveal unique character traits – and the only occasion in 
the novel that seems prepared to attribute an individualizing character trait to him is compromised 
by the narrator before it even appears: “What I've mistaken at first for pomposity on Owen's part is 
actually just drunkenness” (201). The alternative interpretation, the act of pulling open the material 
body of Paul Owen, seems incongruent relative to the activity in the scene. In literal terms, it is 
Owen's mouth and face that are “open” and it is the tool that is “pull[ed],” not Owen's internal 
organs: his corpse, otherwise, remains reportedly intact. 
 
Accepting the coincidence of meanings attached to a visual sign (identity) and a modulated 
utterance of the sign (a directive) discovers a significant degree of immanent dynamism in the 
novel's language. Specifically, this dynamism may be described as performativity. In Gender 
Trouble (also published during American Psycho's pre-publication controversy), Judith Butler asks 
readers to “[c]onsider gender […] a corporeal style, an 'act,' as it were, which is both intentional 
and performative, where 'performative' suggests a dramatic and contingent construction of 
meaning” (emphasis in original; 190). Setting aside the discussion of patriarchal hegemony in the 
language tradition by recognizing that the novel's English language does not have gender forms, 
Butler's search for a body with immanent gender may be conceived in the pared down terms of a 
search for body with immanent quality. She arrives at a conceptualization of a corporeal style in a 
discussion that departs from Foucault's Discipline and Punish from which she quotes: “It would be 
wrong to say that the soul is an illusion […] it exists, it has a reality, it is produced permanently 
around, on, within the body” (184). It follows that Foucault's soul is a product of conditioning 
(namely, disciplinary) that formally appears, according to Butler, in the performance of corporeal 
style that is an “intentional [..] dramatic and contingent construction of meaning” (Butler 190). 
Language may also be viewed by these same terms, which is not, necessarily, to argue that language 
has a soul, but rather that it may appear to have one through the performance of corporeal style. 
 
It should be noted that Paul Owen's significance in the narrative derives from the two significant 
ways his presence disables the traditional frameworks that 'promise' an ontological transformation: 
in the Judeo-Christian tradition, religious salvation and in juridical framework, the becoming the 
disciplined inmate, simultaneously the celebrified, infamous serial killer. The transformation from a 
corporal through death to an eternal body as 'promised' in the Judeo-Christian framework follows 
directly and acts as an introduction to the juridical framework's promise of a transformation from a 
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deviant to a disciplined subject. According to conventional consideration, these structures primarily 
subject human individuals who subsequently internalize the effects of their mechanisms, yet, as is 
shown, the novel's language also appears to reflect an internalization, or a consideration, of these 
systems. 
 
Primarily, the narrator's interest in Paul Owen derives from the fact that he is “handling the Fisher 
account” (34; 57; 58; 136; 137; 371). Critical discussion of the “Fisher account” conceives it as a 
material status signifier and Bateman's jealousy is rooted in the fact that Owen possesses an entirely 
unique commodity (Szetala 39-40). This argument appears to have validity within Szetala's critical 
framework, circumscribed and imposed on the text. However, this line of criticism fails to take a 
fully ontological approach, reflective of all the elements of corporeal style, to the language of 
“Fisher account”: that is it fails to consider the language as an intentional and dramatic expression 
of embodied meaning, contingently constructed. 
 
Despite the name appearing seventeen times in the narrative, the “Fisher account” is never 
explained. However, there is some significant textual support for reading it as an intentional 
intertextual allusion to the Arthurian legend of the Fisher King. According to the Arthurian tale, the 
Fisher King is the latest in a long line of descendants charged with the task of keeping the Holy 
Grail: the legendary cup that Jesus Christ filled with his 'blood' and offered to his disciples at the 
Last Supper. In terms of textual evidence to support this Christian-themed reading, an allusion to 
the fallen angel Lucifer may arguably appear when Owen, in a uniquely personal admission, claims 
to “have a cousin who manages All We Need of Hell” (138). A series of contextual evidence 
appears in the narrator's description of his interaction with Owen: 
When I press for information about the Fisher account he offers useless statistical data that I 
already knew about: how Rothschild was originally handling the account [note: the name of 
a famous Jewish personage suggests pre-Christian heritage], how Owen came to acquire it. 
And though I had Jean [Bateman's secretary] gather this information for my files months 
ago, I keep nodding, pretending that this primitive info is revelatory and saying things like 
“This is enlightening” while at the same time telling him “I'm utterly insane” and “I like to 
dissect girls.” (emphasis added; 201)     
Furthermore, the indication of a Jewish predecessor informs a reading of Owen's given name as an 
allusion to the Paul the Apostle: a reading that is supported in the context of “primitive,” 
“revelatory” and “enlightening.” 
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Owen's proposed namesake in the first century Christian apostle introduces a dramatized precedent 
of transformation in both name and character, while carrying relevancy in relation to vision (see 
Section 1.3 below), violence and fleeing abroad. According to the “primitive info” (Ellis American 
201) of the New Testament, Saul (who, after his conversion to Christianity would change his name 
to Paul) was known for persecuting and uttering violent threats toward Christians living near 
Jerusalem. On a journey near Damascus, Saul had an “enlightening” (201) experience: a sudden 
light struck him to the ground and the voice of Jesus asked Saul why does he persecute? When Saul 
stood up, he was blind. He remained blind for three days until the disciple Ananias, acting on divine 
instruction, visited him and restored his sight: “revelatory” (201). After which Saul preached in the 
synagogues, claiming that Jesus is the Son of God and, in response, the Jews conspired to kill him. 
He fled to Jerusalem to join the disciples, who at first doubted his faith, but after learning of the 
threat to his life, sent him off to Tarsus (cf. Holy Bible, New International Version, Acts 9.1-30). 
 
As Paul flees to Tarsus from Jerusalem to escape mortal threat, Owen reportedly leaves New York 
for London after the narrator has killed him. In effect, the incongruent reports – Bateman's reported 
murder in New York (204) and Carnes' reported sighting of Owen in London (330) – reconstruct 
the modern conflict between Reason and religion regarding life-after-death. The conceptualization 
of uncertainty in regards to Bateman's criminal guilt reflects a traditional religious and historically-
informed programming in the technology or ontology of the signs. When critics charge the narrator 
with unreliability, their reasoning might then be said to reflect a rational, post-Enlightenment, and, 
in other words, disciplinary mode of thinking. In consideration of the narrative's unreliability and 
uncertainty, critical interest in what the subject is reflects a search for Truth, which, as reported or 
reflected in the novel, is formally not accessible through language. 
 
Facing the irrecoverable uncertainty (effected in the novel through an allusion to the after-life) 
critics have resorted, as is illustrated in the previous section, to imposing their various models, 
prescribed with certain values that recall the modes of disciplinary institutions in their invention and 
application of specific mechanisms whose design is informed by its aim to construct, for example, 
the disciplined factory worker at the site of the individual. For example, one could consider the 
uncertainty in American Psycho as a metaphysical – contingent on Mikhail Bakhtin's conception – 
response to an 'ideal' novel form, with “its spirit of process and inconclusiveness” (7). In accepting 
this contingency, with uncertainty as the novel's defining mode of logic a disciplinary mode appears 
to discover the same truth responsible for designing its analysis. The characteristics of the novel 
form, as a considered by Bakhtin, may simply be attributed to the consideration of human life as “a 
spirit of process.” The narrator's unreliability in relation to his account of the murders may also be 
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perceived as allegorical or operating on the symbolic level. It is conceivable to consider the 
irrecoverable uncertainty as an allegorical value reflecting the unresolvable historical relation 
between the Jewish and Christian faiths – where Bateman's murder of Owen echoes the Jewish 
conspiracy to kill St. Paul. The uncertainty in the novel appears to illustrate the inaccessibility of 
Truth through analysis. 
 
The novel, in explicit terms, is a machine with its own limits that reproduces these limits at the 
site of the subjects, both of its subject-reader and its subject- narrator. Considering language as 
informed by its access to recorded historical knowledge and its limits (after-life) serves to 
regulate its subject's, the narrator's activities. For instance, a number of circumstances in the 
novel appear that are potentially transformative, yet are not transformative because his 
knowledge reveals its limitations. In one such instance, Bateman encounters Tom Cruise who is 
“wearing the same pair of black Wayfarers I have on”(67): an important sign that Cruise, for 
Bateman, represents a figure worthy of emulation. Bateman reflects his knowledge that Cruise 
lives in the penthouse apartment and his respect for the actor as he “courte[ously], without asking 
him, [presses] the PH button and [Cruise] nods thank you” (67). While this circumstance appears 
as an opportunity for Bateman to befriend Cruise in lieu of access to further displays of prowess 
(eg. Cruise's penthouse, his social circle and celebrity parties) Bateman fails to connect with 
Cruise on the personal level, which may have been essential to accessing Cruise's private sphere, 
because his information about Cruise is limited to the knowledge of his inhabiting the penthouse 
and the roles he has played in films. Furthermore, the potential of the latter bit of information is 
compromised as he demonstrates an ignorance of the actual film titles: “'I thought you were very 
fine in Bartender.' […] 'Cocktail. Not Bartender. The film was called Cocktail.' A long pause 
follows […] silence, obvious and heavy between us” (68). Neither Bateman nor Cruise are 
wrong here. As Cruise lives in penthouse, it could even be said with his head in the clouds, he is 
literally illustrated as living or existing on a different level than Bateman. When Cruise 'corrects' 
Bateman, he signals a philosophical perspective that considers representations (i.e. the media of 
film) as describing reality. Bateman, on the other hand, seems to take a perspective from where 
representations (i.e. Cruise was “in [the identity of] Bartender”) are reality. 
 
In a later scene, his ex-girlfriend realizes that he has hung his prized and valuable contemporary 
artwork upside down and laughs at him, effectively disarming his presumption of authority on 
contemporary art and seemingly making a joke of his lack of knowledge. In response, or 
retaliation, he resorts to violence: both screaming and arming himself with a nail gun. While her 
murder was perhaps inevitable [earlier, Bateman is “locking the door, making sure it's bolted 
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shut” (229)], she may represent the love he does not have – a force that appears also to offer the 
possibility of transformation later in the novel as discussed below – yet her laughing at him, 
directly followed by his violence, seems to be the more direct cause of his immediate violence. 
In this case she embodies a disciplinary apparatus insofar as she reproduces conventional limits 
that (violently) question his freedom to hang the painting in any way he chooses. When she asks 
him “[h]ow long has it been this way?” a sense of unflinching confidence – as opposed to a 
realization of having made a mistake – seems to qualify his answer: “A millennium” (230). This 
signals his foundation in the historical processes of knowledge. 
 
As the relationship between individual, anarchic freedom becoming limited by traditional 
institutions associated with discipline (school, church, barracks, factory, prison) Bateman's 
violence may be seen as representing the sort of desperation that might have qualified the 
disciplinary recourse to 'violent' means as a method to structure society in a desirable manner. 
The novel cites Miss Manners (Judith Martin) in its prologue that considers “restraints” as 
necessary: “One of the major mistakes people make us that they think manners are only 
expressions of happy ideas. There's a whole range of behavior that can be expressed in a 
mannerly way. […] In civilization there have to be some restraints. If we followed every 
impulse, we'd be killing one another.” Appearing in the prologue, this citation may be seen as 
disclosing to the narrative that follows that the violence of “killing one another” represents the 
natural free expression of human character. 
 
Through discipline, or manners, the individual's access to what constitutes the ideal notion of 
freedom is limited. By rendering the disciplinary mechanisms as violent machines in their effect 
of limiting freedom, the ex-girlfriend's laughter may come to represent the violence of the entire 
disciplinary system, perhaps named in the novel as “Robert Hall”: the violence erupts Bateman 
screams “What the fuck are you doing with Robert Hall?” (230)]. This complicates the scene on 
a fundamental level as it suggests a potential reversal in the roles of the killer and the victim, 
raising the question: which of the two – Bateman's anarchic freedom or her disciplined subject – 
is the victim and which is the killer? 
 
What remains after removing the notions of imposed meaning is a language, a technology that is 
hermetically contingent: reflecting the character of the knowledge of the age into which it is born 
with a performance capacity reflecting the limits of the ontological structure as it appears within the 
novel. The signs are characterized by their visual primacy with access to verbal representation and 
flexible relation to profound historical knowledge that appears in its limit at the fundamentally 
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uncertain reference to Truth. The inability of the narrator to access the transformative 'promises' of 
religious salvation is considered to reflect the limits of the human subject, described in the limits of 
knowledge regarding Truth, and the attainment of an eternal life. 
 
 
2.4 What the Subject Can Do 
 
2.4.1 Admission 
 
Criticism almost unanimously conceives the novel, if not in terms of its whole as a “confession of a 
yuppie serial killer” (emphasis added; Storey 58), at least as a narrative containing “confessions” 
(Zaller 321; Helyer 740; Allue 77; et al) with one early exception in Carla Freccero. He word 
“confession” appears only once and its object is nothing: “[t]his confession has meant nothing...” 
(352). The notion of confession as “a formal statement admitting that one is guilty of a crime” 
(Oxford Dictionaries) becomes, following Foucault, “an interiorization that incites to a perpetual 
judgment of the self through scrutiny of one's behaviors and thoughts” (Bogaerts 112). The 
narrative of American Psycho seems rather to be a meticulous consideration of surfaces: both in 
terms of the narrator's physical appearance and the surface of the language. In fact the narrative 
appears to be a marked reversion and inversion of the progress considered by Foucault in the quote 
supplied by Bogaerts from Foucault's History of Sexuality: 
We have passed from a pleasure to be recounted and heard, centering on the heroic or 
marvelous narration of “trials” of bravery or sainthood, to a literature ordered according to 
the infinite task of extracting from the depths of oneself, in between the words, a truth which 
the very form of the confession holds out like a shimmering mirage. (qtd. in Bogaerts 101). 
Rather than describing Bateman's activities as “'trials' of bravery or sainthood,” it would be more 
accurate to describe them as meaningless exercises in exploitation. He attacks and murders an 
unsuspecting man walking his dog: “I lean down, giving the appearance of picking up the briefcase, 
but because of the shadows I'm leaning into he doesn't see me pull out the knife [...]” (153). He kills 
a hungry and tired homeless man, “panting with the exertion it takes to sit up” (122). He surprises a 
delivery boy: “I find myself crouched in the doorway […] leaping out at a passing Japanese 
delivery boy, I knock him off his bicycle and drag him into the doorway [...]” (166). He also, most 
infamously lures sex workers to his apartment with money to torture and dismember them (158; 
272). The descriptions of murders taking place in the language mark the language as inherently 
superficial, particularly as it appears without consequence: the language can appear to confess to 
crimes, without constituting a confession to crimes. 
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Considering the language in terms of what it can do, potentially opens the space of the confession's 
object to every admission that appears in this self-reflexive passage and, through the concept of the 
narrator's unified identity, to every admission in the entirety of the novel, as Storey's assessment 
reflects. The language may at once appear mimicking the conception of significant religious 
transformation: “'This is enlightening” while at the same time telling him 'I'm utterly insane' and 'I 
like to dissect girls'” (201). Here the ontological language appears at the limits of its performative 
ability, as merely representative: able to “dissect girls” but unable to dissect girls. And so it may 
seem that, considering this limit of ontological language, “This confession has meant nothing...” 
(352).   
 
However, American Psycho begs to differ and does so in two qualitative ways. Firstly, the narrative 
reflects a reversion toward the values assigned to displays of preeminence in pre-disciplinary 
societies. Not only does the proclivity to display accurately reflects the visual character of the sign, 
the acts of these displays may be seen as opposing the values assigned to confession by the 
disciplinary tradition. Secondly, in terms of quantitative measurements, the language in the novel 
suggests a strong preference for admission over confession. 
 
This thesis argues that language confronts an immanent limit in the subject of the 'narrator' that is 
inscribed in language. Where confession lends the subject to a juridical system, offering a new, 
transformed subject in the disciplined inmate, a “confession” of the acts described in language do 
not have this capacity without evidence of the act in the real world. In other words, “This 
confession has meant nothing...” may be subject primarily to a literal interpretation: meaning 
“nothing” as opposed to all other possible objects. Where later critics continue to use the word 
“confession” to describe the narrative they do so without acknowledging what Carla Freccero, early 
in the tradition, called “Foucauldian irony”: “Bateman's confession […] succeeds in revealing 
absolutely nothing, not because anything remains hidden, but because there is no truth to be 
revealed, extracted, and expiated in confession” (emphasis added; 51). Admission is an expressed 
acknowledgement of truth, whereas confession is an expressed acknowledgement of criminal guilt: 
in the United States, freedom of expression quite strictly precludes language from the realm of 
criminal guilt. 
 
Furthermore the narrative expressly limits its use of “confession” to this single occasion, while 
employing the word “admit” approximately fifty times, including at the so-called “climactic 
confession” (Eldridge 30): “I leave a message, admitting everything” (330). Additionally, in the 
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same self-reflexive passage in the chapter titled “End of the 1980s,” a few lines above the word 
confession, 'admit' appears in syntax that suggests lending the term primacy in relation to the whole 
of the novel: “I want no none to escape. But even after admitting this – and I have, countless times, 
in just about every act I've committed – and coming face-to-face with these truths, there is no 
catharsis” (emphasis added; 352). Formally considering the language in terms of what it can do and 
what it cannot do effectively liberates the medium, allowing it to be performative “in just about 
every act”: to “admit” its own truth “countless times.” The crafting of this syntactical structure 
assigns both a retro- and prospective relationship on “this” in respect to the surrounding signs: 
“admitting” refers both to “I want no one to escape” and “every act I've committed.” 
 
In signifying as an opening or invitation, “admit” is commonly used in the novel as a way of 
presenting or introducing the narrator's conception of a truth, more or less grounded in an 'objective' 
reality: for example, addressing the object-subject of a “hardbody,” the narrator remarks “I can't 
help noticing that one knee is, admittedly, bigger than the other” (45). In this example, the knee, 
seems to be assessed by the narrator in relation to the ideal form or objective concept of the knee. 
The notion of the ideal seems to be the 'objective truth' that Bateman refers to with “admittedly.” 
However, the narrator may only resort to expressing the 'values' of each knee in relation to one 
another, since the knees appear within the limits of language, which, bound to hermetic referential 
values, cannot appear to have value outside contingency: as nothing may appear in the ideal form. 
Realizing that each knee has distinct, albeit “almost imperceptibl[e]” characteristics, it follows that 
neither can meet the ideal form: “this unnoticeable flaw now seems overwhelming and we all lose 
interest” (45-6). 
 
Admittedly, just as there is limited recourse to philosophical studies of the ontological nature of the 
plant, animal and other natural science kingdoms, there seems to be virtually no recourse to a 
similar knowledge of the language kingdom. It should, however, be considered premature and 
shortsighted to decide that the subjects of these kingdoms are not privy to something of an 
ontological status: particularly as we are very likely approaching the advent of artificial intelligence, 
which holds significant promise for an ontological Archimedean point. 
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2.4.2  Addiction 
 
Gilles Deleuze, in the Historical section of his short, enigmatic essay “Postscript on the Societies of 
Control” (hereafter “Postscript”) credits Foucault, not only for providing a “brilliant” analysis of 
disciplinary institutions but also for perceiving “the transience of this model” (3). As disciplinary 
societies succeeded the societies of sovereignty, a new social model would supersede the 
disciplinary society. Deleuze marks the historical time of this later transition in the middle of the 
twentieth century, suggesting that “the disciplines underwent a crisis to the benefit of new forces 
that were gradually instituted and which accelerated after World War II” (“Postscript” 3). In his 
essay, Deleuze credits William S. Burroughs for naming these new forces “control” and works to 
develop Burroughs's insights regarding the nature of control that were originally illustrated in the 
novel Naked Lunch from 1959. Publishing “Postscript” in 1990, Deleuze names the new model of 
society, which has emerged out of discipline's crisis, a society of control.    
 
Following Burroughs's conceptualization, addiction – or what, in Naked Lunch, is referred to as 
“The Algebra of Need” (172) – may be described as the immanent logical structure of the motivated 
being, the basis of control. Importantly, Allen Ginsberg, in the testimony he provided at the Naked 
Lunch obscenity trial in Boston suggests that “heroin addiction,” in Burroughs's novel is “a model 
for addiction to many other things beside drugs”: including “addiction to homosexuality”; “the 
United States addiction to materialistic goods and properties”; “addiction to money”; “and most of 
all, an addiction to the power or addiction to controlling other people by having power over them.” 
One of the most significant aspects of Burroughs's writings, according to contemporary art theorist, 
Charles Russell, is that Burroughs constructs characters that are the uncritical subjects of “incessant 
[…] forces of exploitation” (31): on the surface, American Psycho's narrator seems similarly 
conditioned. Russell suggests, however, that Burroughs's novels – representing “the most graphic 
and extreme expression of anarchic idealism and rage in contemporary literature” – depict 
characters struggling to realize freedom because “to actively oppose the enemy insures that one 
remains defined by them” (31). Russell's conceptualization of what Burroughs's is suggesting – to 
“struggle against social control means to battle against one's prior identification with it” – 
foregrounds the analysis of Bateman's violence which may be conceived as the quality that saves 
him from becoming – what in Burroughs's novels – represents the “greatest danger”: that is “to 
allow oneself to be rigidly defined by something external to oneself” (Russell 31). 
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According to the logic, relative values are assigned by the addiction to subjects reflective of the 
subject's ability to placate the need of the addiction. In other words, the assignment of values 
follows an “Algebra,” which may be considered as a system of correlative play between the 
objective, the Need, which is prescribed by the immanent addiction and the relative values of the 
addiction's subjects: the value attributed to the subject is a reflection of how adequately the subject 
is able to placate the Need. 
 
Junk, insofar only may – and only temporarily – placate a junk addiction, is the objective: it is 
immanent and all else – its subjects – are assigned their value in relation to their ability to further 
the addict-subject's pursuit of the objective. This conceptual framework of addiction informs the 
narrative of American Psycho in the addiction to appearance – as a way of saying, an addiction to 
existing that conforms to its own ontological capacity, or the superficial manifestation reflecting the 
human existential conditioning in the history of language. The analysis of the narrative in these 
terms appears below. Here the “Algebra of Need,” which describes the value system related to 
addiction, is shown to inform the narrator of Naked Lunch: 
And the junk was running low. So there we are in this no-horse [horse is a common slang 
term for heroin, i.e. junk] town strictly from cough syrup. And vomited the cough syrup and 
drove on and on, cold spring wind whistling through that old heap around our shivering, sick 
sweating bodies and the cold you always come down with when the junk runs out of you... 
(13-14) 
In this excerpt, the addict-subject is entirely oriented by the immanent logic of addiction. The 
internal orientation – toward placating the immanent addiction – is evident in the virtual assembly 
(as opposed to the disassembling) of a metaphorical matroyshka doll: the hostile addiction within 
“you” – the addict-subject – is evidenced by “the cold you always come down with when the junk 
runs out of you”; and “you” are inside one of these “shivering, sick sweating bodies” enclosed 
within “that old heap,” an automobile. 
 
The “Algebra of Need” informs a relational system as addiction inscribes value on the other 
subjects. The “cough syrup,” which may be perceived as an alternative to heroin, reaches its limited 
value as it appears to be an inadequate substitute when it is rejected by the body. The body's value 
as a vehicle to serve the addiction discovers its limits as sickness appears in the symptoms of 
withdrawal and delivers, ultimately, an allusion to the bodily limit of mortality. The automobile is 
similar to the body insofar as its value is also in its being a vehicle used in service of the addiction: 
and in terms of its capacity for speed, the automobile's value exceeds that of the body's. On one 
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hand, the phrase “old heap” seems to signal a parallel between the automobile's 'poor health' and the 
'sickness' of its passenger. Yet, on the other, still in terms of physiology, the value of the automobile 
for the addict is fundamentally limited by its incapacity to be the physiological vehicle that delivers 
the junk to placate to the immanent addiction. Finally, in terms of heroin addiction, the narrator's 
physiological body is the essential vehicle, both in terms of carrying the addiction and placating it. 
 
The “Algebra of Need” may be appropriated as a critical framework for understanding the values 
and limits of what the subject can do, in terms of placating the objective that the critic posits as the 
novel's, so-called addiction. The critic Marcus Abel seems to understand American Psycho as 
representing an addiction to the task of writing as described by Gilles Deleuze: “We write only at 
the frontiers of our knowledge, at the border which separates our knowledge from our ignorance 
and transforms one into the other” (qtd. in Abel 147). Abel might be understood as perceiving 
violence as the subject in the novel that is most qualified to placate, as its framework seems to 
mirror, the addiction: by Abel's account, “violence is […] precisely such a frontier […] remain[ing] 
one of the great incomprehensible events of life” (147). In its violence, American Psycho is writing 
at this frontier, its “value appears to be precisely in presenting us with the practice of writing […] in 
experimenting with that which is 'unknown' to us” (147). Abel argues that the novel inhabits this 
frontier by offering symptoms without etiology, without explanation, and merely presents the 
violence as “forces that produce specific affective effects” at the site of the reader (148). What the 
novel can do is produce the reader's experience of ignorance, which in being experienced by the 
reader, is transformed into experiential knowledge. 
 
The critic C. Namwali Serpell commends Abel for “attempt[ing] to investigate what the violence in 
the novel does, turning us away from meaning and towards function” (emphasis in original; 71) and 
takes up the task of carefully investigating the subject of repetition in the novel. Discovering 
repetition as compounding through countless forms (eg. in sequential signifiers, brand names, 
habitual activities, places, chapter titles, identities, etc.) leads her, firstly, to suggest that repetition 
in the novel effects “a vacuation of signification” (58). Secondly, repetition functions in the novel 
as a vehicle whose value is in its ability to construct the reader's expectancy: enabling readers to 
“know” that violence will be repeatedly encountered has the effect of involving them in a 
complicated ethical circumstance. Serpell similarly conceives the novel in its addiction to a frontier 
between ignorance and knowledge: more specifically, in its objective to construct a frontier on the 
reader's plane of ethics. Posing the troubling questions: What are the ethical implications of 
accepting, or eagerly anticipating the experiential knowledge of violence? On the other hand, what 
does it mean to stop reading, to in a sense, close your eyes and accept ignorance? 
 35 
 
Witness-Subject 
 
Serpell suggests that a “vacuation of signification” (58) coupled with violence can be “ethically 
useful,” as it allows readers to “confront violence as violence […] without escape routes of 
meaning. Violence and ethics may be the safest way to explore the darkest corners of the self” 
(emphasis in original; 69). In effect she dispels the notion of the reader's capacity to interpret the 
text, ultimately conceding that the text merely appears and in appearing, it may become “useful” as 
a framework to perceive the limits of one's own personal ethics. In this final note, Serpell betrays 
that her ethical interest has involved an discipline all along: the interest in what the aspects of the 
novel can do are ultimately conceived in terms of what it can do to reveal what the subject is, 
namely the reader, the ethical-subject. 
 
Incidentally, thesis concedes to a similar perspective, yet conceives of the reader as rendered 
essentially passive – as a mere witness-subject – even in relation to their internal ethical discourse. 
The concept of the witness suggests a limited 'readerly' capacity, stripped of the interpreting 
capacity and implying a relation to the narrative that may testify to the truth of its appearances. 
Considering the implications involved with interpreting “I am an noncontingent human being” 
(352), which appears in the novel within the same self-reflexive passage discussed above, offers 
support for reconcieving the reader-subject as the witness-subject. In the merest act of regarding the 
proposed word “noncontingent” the space of the subject-reader becomes the space of subject-
witness. The act of reading, insofar as it traditionally involves the assignation of meaning to words, 
encounters the impossible word “noncontingent.” The 'subject-reader' must fail to put the word into 
a relation that could render it visible; must fail in attempts to represent it, so as to at least render it 
uniform and thereby produce its vulnerability to deviancy as method to make it appear. Every effort 
to be a subject-reader of the word immediately, fundamentally alters its very being in an act that 
violently strips it of the prefix of its 'identity.' In the final section of this thesis, the narrative is 
discussed from the perspective of a witness-subject: witnessing the novel as it appears.  The one 
consolation that may be offered to the subject-witness is the memory of the negative as the language 
reveals its relationship to historical knowledge. Jean Baudrillard expresses a concern that the 
increasing digitalization of images effects the negative's disappearance: “negative” in terms of 
analog photography represents, for Baudrillard, a “irrefutable testimon[ial] […] [of the] blank 
between object and image” (37). 
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As the discussion becomes framed by a positivistic discourse of ethics, the criticism is implicated as 
the biopower. The idea of ethics, insofar as it belongs to the positive realm, precludes the potential 
for any “[dark] corners of the self” (Serpell 69). Ethical values, having been imposed on the subject 
through various traditional apparatuses, are merely reproduced in the reader's 'exploration' of their 
'self.' Discipline, in reconfiguring the individual as biopower to reproduce its normative value 
system, at the same time, produces abnormality, deviancy, resistance or opposition. Thus, as 
Serpell's discussion falls under the heading of ethics – with its 'good' and 'bad' values – the reader is 
actually confronting an idea of the self that is affected by a “disciplinary invasion of power” and 
implicated in reproducing deviancy within themself. 
 
Burroughs's model of addiction seems to be a framework capable of describing the logic of a fully-
realized, post-disciplinary realm of biopower. Insofar as addiction represents the conceptualization 
of an “integral, vital function that every individual embraces and reactivates of his or her own 
accord” (Hardt and Negri 24), it surpasses discipline in terms of effectuality by eliminating the 
potential for resistance. What was formerly opposition or resistance is rather, in the framework of 
addiction absorbed into the ever-onward pursuit of the objective. What constituted an oppositional 
force in discipline appears as a subject ascribed with minimal value in terms of its capacity to serve 
the continuous pursuit of the objective. In other words, 'opposing forces' are integrated and appear 
in the short term perhaps as a reduction in velocity, a change in form, etc.: these alterations effect 
what Deleuze calls “modulations” (“Postscript” 4). 
 
In this post-disciplinary context of American Psycho, the act of naming as an imposition, or an 
exertion of power over the subject no longer produces the occasion for resistance, but rather of 
modulation of the subject's value in relation to an ever-present objective. All of American Psycho's 
critics recognize that names in the novel are often miss-assigned and characters commonly 
misidentified, yet none of the characters resist their misidentification through an attempt to, for 
instance, assert their real name. It seems that all of the critics have failed to consider the possible 
significance in the absence of resistance to this common phenomenon in the novel. Arguably the 
most significant misidentification in the novel is on the occasion when Paul Owen misidentifies the 
narrator. Bateman does not take offense or feel threatened by any power that could be associated 
with Owen's misidentifying him as Halberstam: 
Owen has mistaken me for Marcus Halberstam […] but for some reason it really doesn't 
matter and it seems a logical faux pas since Marcus works at P & P also, in fact does the 
exact same thing as I do, and he also has a penchant for Valentino suits and clear 
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prescription glasses and we share the same the barber at the same place, the Pierre Hotel, so 
it seems understandable; it doesn't irk me. (85) 
On the contrary, Bateman assumes this given name of Halberstam and leverages the 
misidentification as an opportunity to further his objective, which this thesis argues is an addiction 
to appearance. 
 
Importantly, appearance also more distinctly addresses the fundamental relationship between the 
literary work and the reader, which is largely a visual framework, and a framework of extraordinary 
importance in the novel. American Psycho is arguably replete with evidence suggesting the 
inestimable importance of the visual perspective in the novel. Criticism interested in what the 
subject is commonly rely on psychoanalytical terms in probing the text for an etiology: how an 
abusive past suffered by Norman Bates's of Hitchcock's Psycho explains his behavior in the film is 
a particularly relevant example and is examined below. In searching American Psycho for a similar 
etiology to explain the narrator's behavior, analysts inevitably come across the single instance when 
the narrator turns his gaze in the direction of his father. Significantly, his father only appears in a 
representative visual medium, the photograph, leaving the narrator to make his father appear 
through one of the novel's rare instances of ekphrasis: 
In the photograph of my father he's wearing a six-button double-breasted black sport coat, a 
white spread-collar cotton shirt, a tie, pocket square, shoes, all by Brooks Brothers. He's 
standing next to one of the topiary animals a long time ago at his father's estate in 
Connecticut and there's something the matter with his eyes. (emphasis added; 342) 
Notably, the eyes are the only physical feature of his father that appear in this description which, 
like countless other descriptions of characters in the novel, could easily be interpreted as the 
description of a visual advertisement appearing in a magazine for a line of clothing. Similar to this 
instance of ekphrasis, the other descriptions seem to effectively dislodge the notion of a 
representation – the advertisement appearing in a magazine – from its quality of being a 
representation. They are brought to life in a sense that is literally connected to the visual sense – 
“[there is] something the matter with his eyes.” 
 
This phrase signifies both as the common idiomatic expression meaning 'there's something wrong' 
and the literal interpretation, 'there is something [significant, because material, tangible] with his 
eyes'; the latter reading finds support in its echo: “Evelyn says angrily […] 'Your animosity is 
grounded on nothing. There must be something really the matter with you'” (emphasis added; 314). 
In this other instance, both idiomatic and literal meanings are present and made significantly more 
complex and forceful in being qualified by the similarly idiomatic/ literal reading of the emphasized 
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words. It signifies, in other words, as you have no reason to be upset and your expression is without 
orientation and yet, you really are material. 
3. Corporeal Vision of Language 
 
3.1. Corporeal Vision in Inferno and American Psycho 
 
Disciplinary modes are featured in the opening of Baudrillard's essay as he discusses how the 
accumulation of knowledge about the real world becomes the impetus for analysis, which is then 
redeployed to transform the real world: “paradoxically, the real world begins to disappear at the 
very same time as it begins to exist” (11). This transformation may also be considered in historical 
terms of the forces leading up to the Enlightenment followed by the production of the disciplinary 
subject. In other words, disciplined subjects are no longer 'real' individuals, but rather objects of 
social engineering, manufactured to accord with and reproduce the ideal required of the current 
system of production. In outpacing, in terms of efficiencies, factory system effected the former 
domestic system's demise and, in turn, created the factory worker through the deployment of 
disciplinary mechanisms (i.e. the time clock, hourly wage, constant supervision, etc.) which had not 
been present in the domestic system. A similar phenomenon, Baudrillard avers, occurs in the 
processes of developing language and concepts: “[b]y representing things to ourselves, by naming 
them and conceptualizing them, human beings call them into existence and hasten their doom, 
subtly detach them from their brute reality” (11). Simply stated, “the real vanishes into the concept” 
(12). Examining the novel's first line ABANDON ALL HOPE YE WHO ENTER HERE provides 
an exemplary impetus for a discussion regarding disappearance through forces of conceptualization 
and analysis: Baudrillard reminds his readers that “'to analyse' means literally 'to dissolve'” (11). 
 
John Freccero's article “Infernal Irony: The Gates of Hell” is an invaluable source of background 
material from which to approach not only Dante's work, but as this thesis argues, American Psycho, 
as well: particularly in terms of vision, appearance and disappearance. Above, this thesis argued 
that Paul Owen's given name may refer to St. Paul the Apostle and the religious historical figure 
reappears here in relation to Dante. Freccero remarks that, “[t]o speak of vision in the Middle Ages 
was to evoke the experience of St. Paul who, in his letter to the Corinthians, claimed to been 'rapt to 
the third heaven,' where he saw things that it is not lawful for a man to reveal” (J. Freccero 769). 
Presuming that Paul's concept of “the third heaven” derived from his unique experience of meeting 
God face-to-face, exegetes speculated on the meaning for centuries. According to Freccero, St. 
Augustine's commentary provided the most authoritative conceptualization of Paul's experience, 
“distinguishing three distinct modes of vision”: 
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Corporeal vision was vision in the ordinary sense through the organs of the body. By 
spiritual vision, Augustine meant imaginative vision, whether stimulated directly by the 
senses or indirectly by writing, memory or dreams. Finally intellectual vision was of the 
highest order, bringing total understanding with it […] a direct intuition of the Truth, “face 
to face” […] without mediation or accommodation. (emphasis added; J. Freccero 769-70) 
Freccero suggests that Dante may have attempted to represent, in the poetic compositions of his 
Divine Comedy's three parts – Purgatorio, Inferno, Paradisio – the three Augustinian 
conceptualizations of vision: respectively, the imaginative, corporeal and intellectual. The challenge 
hypothetically undertaken by Dante is present in the language's limited capacity for representing the 
disparate conceptualizations of vision. Writing, Freccero concedes, naturally belongs to the 
imaginative realm: “the interpretation of sensation” (771). “The difficulty” Dante faces is in writing 
the other two parts where “corporeal vision falls short of the imagination, while intellectual vision 
transcends it” (emphasis added; J. Freccero 771). It may follow that the corporeal vision informing 
Dante's Inferno may also significantly inform American Psycho as both texts begin with this iconic 
phrase. For the definition of icon, Freccero cites C.S. Pierce's theory of signs: “we might say that 
the words on the page cease to become symbols and become icons, signs that resemble their own 
significance” (J. Freccero 775). The relationship to Dante's Inferno may supply an alternative 
conception of the novel – one that marks the work as an intentional accomplishment in form and 
style – to those critics who have might considered its superficial aesthetics as a 'failure' to 
adequately interpret sensation. Dante's possible interest in representing corporeal vision is 
understood as providing support and further impetus for this thesis to examine the novel in terms of 
the corporeal 'material' of the novel's signs, as described in the above, ontological section on 
ontological language. Following the recognition that both Inferno and American Psycho begin with 
the 'same' inscription, this thesis considers how the construction of Dante's vision, as understood by 
Freccero, informs the appearance of the Dante's line in Ellis's novel. 
 
Both Dante's and Ellis's text render a temporary, virtual disappearance of the line's significance. The 
“hypothetical first-time reader” would have encountered Dante's original text in the medieval period 
lacking the formal signals (eg. quotation marks, block letters, or italics) that would alert today's 
readers to the fact that the line is an inscription that the narrator is reading aloud (J. Freccero 774). 
In Dante's original text, the lack of these signals cause his reader “to wait until the fourth tercet in 
order to realize that the pilgrim has been thrust in front of the infernal portals and sees the text we 
have read” (emphasis in original; 774). A similar experience is effected in American Psycho. The 
quote from Dante appears as the first words of the novel in the beginning of a exceptionally lengthy, 
paragraph-long sentence. At the first formal break in the reading, American Psycho's readers likely 
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feel that they are in the company of a significant character in a significant setting, which may have 
the effect of rendering the already exceedingly “familiar” line from Dante, all but forgotten. 
 
This thesis argues that the line's primary significance in American Psycho is buried in the second 
paragraph: requiring a particular interpretive sensitivity in the approach to the novel that many 
readers are not trained to attend to it. As an example of the lack of interpretive sensitivity consider 
Serpell's account:   
It may feel as though we are slogging through the initial descriptions of consumer culture, 
the first few lists of items, but the readerly training to which Ellis’s repetitions subject us 
soon allows us to accelerate, to skim, and for less conscientious readers, even to skip. […] 
They also make the first violent scene in the novel incredibly shocking; the effect is “sliding 
down the surface of things” only to slam into an aesthetic and ethical wall. (60-1) 
Serpell's observation confirms the novel's success in mimicking Dante's poetics, which Freccero 
describes as a “poetic strategy […] to pretend there is no poetic strategy, to represent the inscription 
with an implied replication of the text” (775). The line's iconicity is already marked in artistic 
renderings of the poem in the centuries directly following Dante: “they had no choice but to 
represent the gate by the text itself” (J. Freccero 775). When readers of American Psycho encounter 
the line, it is as “one of the most familiar passages in Western literature” and minimal effort is 
required of the reader to interpret its significance (J. Freccero 774). As Freccero recounts “[t]he 
pilgrim's difficulty resides in the interpretation of what he sees” (775). In effect, the quality of a 
temporary disappearance or the withholding of the line's significance – marked by the difference 
between seeing and interpreting – that had qualified the original line in Dante is preserved in the 
line's representation in American Psycho. 
 
Carla Freccero, in her criticism of American Psycho, writes that this line from Inferno is “known to 
Dante scholars as 'infernal irony'” (C. Freccero 51). The irony Carla Freccero refers to follows John 
Freccero's observation that the pilgrim's journey actually begins when he “sees the inscription and 
wonders about its meaning […] calling attention to the fact that vision is not interpretation” 
(emphasis added; J. Freccero 772). The “infernal irony” represents Baudrillard's concern with the 
disappearance of the real through processes of analysis: a process of knowledge that transforms the 
real “brute reality” into concepts. Vision, more precisely, the Augustinian intellectual vision that 
characterizes St. Paul's experience of coming face-to-face with Truth, disappears as meaning 
appears. 
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Dante's line appears in American Psycho as a translation, which may be considered as another step 
toward the consolidation of meaning's priority over that of the original vision, of “brute reality.” 
The translation appearing in the novel is distinctly the work of John Ciardi6 significantly of “the 
modern 'critical' school of translation” (Acocella 140): 
Skeptical about the possibility, and the value, of reproducing word for word the content of 
the original (the Victorian ideal of translation), this group, [William J.] De Sua claims, 
turned instead to an interpretive type of translation, in order, if not to replace the original, at 
least to 'show where the treasure lies,' in accordance with Ezra Pound's recommendations in 
his Make It New ... [Ciardi's and Dorothy Sayers's] interpretations of Dante, coupled with 
the insistent emphasis that their “critical” method allows them to give these interpretations, 
lead to some very serious distortions of the text. Most obviously, their shared belief in the 
tanginess of Dante's language does no good service to that language; its subtleties tend to 
become banalities, and its more vigorous colloquial moments take on, particularly in Ciardi, 
a flat crudeness completely foreign to Dante's poetry. (Acocella 140, 142) 
Paradoxically, in an effort to “show where the treasure lies,” and particularly as this effort seems to 
have effected a distortion of the original, both the original and the translation appear, in their 
contingent relation to one another through the quality of their difference. For Joan Acocella, on the 
one hand, Ciardi's translation makes its appearance, ironically, as “subtleties […] become 
banalities” and on the other, relative to Ciardi's “flat crudeness,” Dante's language appears 
somehow nearer to its own originality. In other words, Dante's text and Ciardi's translation may 
only appear – in the evidence of Acocella's text – on the contingency of their relationship to one 
another: the perceived value of one informs the perceived value of the other. 
 
Considering the original and the translation according to the “Algebra of Need,” where the Need is 
specified as appearance, it follows that the contingency of their relationship may be more precisely 
considered as the subjectivation of the one by the other. As the other's subject, each becomes 
assigned a value that reflects its specific capacity to placate the other's immanent addiction to 
appearance: the Need to appear. It must be noted that, this thesis considers neither the original nor 
the translation to be literally constituted in, by or through appearance. Recall Burroughs's junk 
addiction. In the excerpt from Naked Lunch, the automobile and the physiological body of the junk 
                                   
6John Ciardi was a prominent member of the eminent, post-WWII Boston circle of poets, the editor of 
Saturday Review in the 1950's, a Dante scholar and translator, poet and critic. Incidentally he was “one of the 
first literary men, and maybe the first in print, to recognize Naked Lunch as a 'masterpiece'” (Birmingham). 
In his lengthy review of Burroughs's Naked Lunch appearing on the dust jacket of the Olympia Press's first 
edition, Ciardi compares Burroughs to Dante in a convoluted reference: “No less a writer than Dante made it 
a principle of harmonious style deliberately to coarsen the writing when dealing with debased characters as 
his subject matter.” 
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addict are assigned values by their capacity to be vehicles in service of the addiction: as vehicles, 
the automobile's capacity for greater speed awards it a greater value, relative to the limits of the 
physiological body's capacity for speed; in terms of these vehicles' technology, the automobile's 
technological capacity to deliver the junk to the addiction is vastly limited relative to the body's 
technological-physiological capacity. While neither the junk nor the junk addict are considered to 
be the Need, which remains immanent and apart – motivating (transcendent) and unmotivating (a 
temporary placation of the Need) according to the terms of duality – neither of the texts are their 
appearance, rather, they are contingent on their addiction to appearance, on their Need to appear. 
Both Dante's and Ciardi's texts appear through their marked difference from one another, beginning 
with the difference between the Italian and English languages. They continue to appear through 
notable differences in their aesthetic qualities. Dante's text continues to appear on the basis of its 
being the original-subject. 
 
In conceiving Dante's text as the 'original-subject,' it is perceived – removed from its relation to 
Ciardi – in relation to the concept of 'originality.' The concept of originality, once recognized, may 
be generally be understood as assigning a persistent relative value to the 'original-subject.' This 
recalls the Baudrillard's concern of “the real vanish[ing] into the concept”:   
The moment a thing is named, the moment representation and concepts take hold of it, is the 
moment when it begins to lose its energy – with risk that it will become a truth or impose 
itself as an ideology. We may say the same the of the Unconscious and its discovery by 
Freud. It is when a thing is beginning to disappear that the concept appears. (12)   
It might be said that the 'original-subject' is assigned the highest value relative to the Need to appear 
in the moment of its appearance, and before it is conceptualized, named, represented and 
reproduced: each constituting immanent forces of disappearance, which may be conceived of as the 
interiorization of disciplinary logic in the being of the 'real.' It follows that the 'original-subject' is 
assigned the lowest value relative to the Need to appear in the circumstance of mass production, 
which might be considered as an exacerbation of the forces of disappearance. 
 
The technological capacity of mass production constructs a realm that is further removed from the 
original: that is, even further removed than the subjects and technologies of discipline and 
reproduction from the “brute reality,” or what might be considered in Augustinian terms, as “a 
direct intuition of the Truth, “face to face” […] without mediation or accommodation” (J. Freccero 
770). According to John Freccero, Dante's Inferno represents an act of writing that is intentionally 
styled to appear as a “corporeal vision,” which is a character of vision that “falls short of 
imaginative vision” (771). This might suggest that appearance (as the object of corporeal vision) in 
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American Psycho – a narrative replete with references to mass produced objects and insofar as it 
may be understood in relation to Dante's Inferno – is not “stimulated directly by the senses or 
indirectly by writing, memory or dreams” (J. Freccero 769). Where imaginative vision is conceived 
of as an appearance in relation to stimuli, the logic according to which stimuli operate may be, 
potentially, characteristic of corporeal vision. 
 
The logic of contemporary advertising communications for mass produced objects may be shown to 
significantly inform the language of American Psycho. The role of advertising might be described 
as mediating the distance between the consumer's imagination (the realm of sensory stimulation) 
and the consumer's arrival face to face with the object (Augustinian intellectual vision). In formal 
terms, advertising is neither the “imaginative vision” nor the “intellectual vision”: the commodity in 
a highly-materialistic society, such as is represented in the novel, may plausibly be considered as 
representing the conception of “Truth,” as the of the highest order of the visions in St. Augustine's 
writings (J. Freccero 769-70). In mediating the distance between the consumer's imaginative vision 
and their direct vision of the commodity, advertising logic may be seen as appealing to the 
imaginative vision by directly stimulating “the senses or indirectly by, writing, memory or dreams” 
(J. Freccero 769). Assuming a form of logic, advertising may be considered as a representation of a 
corporeal vision, with the Need to appear that is threatened by the significant forces of 
disappearance immanent to the characteristics of advertising (i.e. brand names, representation, 
conceptual values, mass production, etc.) Lastly, the significance given to 'appearance' in this thesis 
may be considered as derived from significance of appearance for advertising in relation to the 
production of economic value, followed by the inestimable influence of the advertising model on 
the conception of American Psycho. 
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3.1. Language Analysis: Evolution of the Disappearance of the Real 
 
This thesis takes the term appearance from the philosophical discourse found in Jean Baudrillard's 
essay “Why Hasn't Everything Already Disappeared?” which follows from the premise that the 
moment something makes its appearance also marks the beginning of its disappearance (10). What 
Baudrillard calls the “inviolable golden rule of duality” is inscribed on, what might be described as 
the immanent or interiorized level of phenomena. In other words, appearance must always occur at 
the expense of disappearance, and vice versa. 
 
This analysis of American Psycho conceives the narrative as an ontological structure that follows an 
immanent logic described as the Need to appear. Deprived of the privileged position of the being 
within technology, this thesis contends that The Need to appear may be, in a sense, considered as a 
potential value-laden framework to conceive of a will to exist for the framework of technology, 
specifically the technology of language and the novel form. 
 
The unconventional introduction of the novel's narrator on the first page is often mentioned in the 
criticism, yet, in lacking critical attention to appearance, the critics generally regard the instance as 
another indication of the novel's uncertainty. The uncertainty remains for Serpell, even as she 
carefully accounts for the form of the appearance in a “doubly removed mode: a second person 
pronoun in a quotation” (58). Significantly, the narrator's presence is pronounced by another 
character, Timothy Price, as he says “I mean the fact remains that no one gives a shit about their 
work, everybody hates their job, I hate my job, you've told me you hate yours” (emphasis in 
original, 3). In isolation, this manner of introducing the narrator is not entirely unconventional. 
However, as the narration is almost exclusively dominated by the voice and presence of Timothy 
Price for the first four pages, this must construct in the hypothetical first reader, without prior 
knowledge of the text, the occasion for a novel turn of events as the narration is completely handed 
over to the control of a first person narrator on page eight. Patrick Bateman emerges for the first 
time as the novel's narrator with the thought “I shiver” (8) – rendering the first instance of the 
embodied narrator as appearing in the circumstance of a body in transition: a proverbial coming in 
from the cold. 
 
The phenomenon of appearing, being subject to the play of duality, is dependent upon the presence 
of a force of disappearance. In other words, the appearing-subject must also be a disappearing-
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subject. This analysis does not by any means exhaust the variety of manners in which the narrator 
makes his appearance in the narrative. This exercise is merely intended to demonstrate the presence 
in the novel of an operational formula that leverages the opportunities for the narrator to appear in a 
novel. The opportunities for the narrator appear become present in the novel's virtually countless 
manifestations of contingencies, wherein the narrator may appear by assuming a quality of 
difference. Difference is considered to be a technique employed by the narrative to placate the 
narrator's Need to appear despite the imposing, ever-encroaching forces of disappearance that are 
particularly omnipresent in an social environment, such as the narrator's, that is thoroughly engaged 
in the consumption of mass produced commodities: where mass production signals uniformity and 
the ultimate disappearance of individuality. In the circumstance where the narrator is assigned the 
name “Bateman” (7) this threat of disappearance appears to be manifest in the dialogue, rendered in 
a common, violent idiom against a voice without attribution in the text that is characterized by a 
traditional, considerate perspective toward the 'individual.' 
“Should we bring flowers?” [without attribution] 
“Nah. Hell, you're banging her, Bateman. Why should we get flowers? [Price says] (7) 
At the same time that the narrator appears – in the given sign of his name – he appears to be 
considerate: a quality that not only makes him appear unique in the present scene where he is seen 
in relation to Price's wholly inconsiderate response, this precedent of Bateman's identity being 
attributed the quality of a considerate individual establishes the opportunity for him to appear again, 
in a later scene, with inconsiderate behavior. In other words, it appears likely that the uncertainty 
that troubles the criticism of American Psycho may be the direct result of the narrator's interest in 
appearing in spite of disappearing, which leads to the 'appearance' of the disappearance of the real, 
that begins in the second chapter. This demonstration primarily traces what might be considered as 
an evolution of the narrator's appearance up to the disappearance of the real and does not presume 
to note every contingency even within this exercise's highly-limited frame of the first chapter. 
 
It follows, that in order for the narrator to appear in the first person, the narrator must first not 
appear in the first person. The narrative is able to illustrate this by disclosing the narrator's presence 
in the second person (3) and then again in the third person surname (7). The filmic cues in these 
first pages, specifically “[p]an down to the Post” (the New York Post) (4) and “[p]anning down to 
the sidewalk there's an ugly old homeless bag lady holding a whip” (5), led Söderlind to conflate 
the “narrative voice” with a “movie camera” (Söderlind 70). This contributes to the impetus of her 
analysis that considers “Price as the external projection of Patrick's interiority” (Söderlind 70). 
Heise considers the filmic cues as evidence “underscor[ing] […] American Psycho's highly stylized 
representations […] condense the mean streets of the city ” (Heise 156). The fact that both critics 
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consider the narrative, implicitly, in a framework of appearances seems to be the direct result, in 
these instances, of vision related to the filmic cues. Importantly, despite the direction given to the 
video camera's lens, the technology may generally be considered as an introduction of an objective 
perspective. Thus when Bateman appears in the first person, he also is appearing as a subjective 
perspective that is specifically located within a physiological body as opposed to the mechanical 
body of a camera.   
 
Coincidentally, it is the act of taking off his Armani overcoat that causes him to “shiver” (8) and for 
his individuality to be conflated with that of Price's identity. In other words, the narrator's first 
appearance as the first person, subjective perspective of a 'human' (because of the physiological hint 
in “shiver”) is simultaneously met by uniformity's force of disappearance. Arriving at Evelyn's 
apartment, Courtney greets both characters: 
I shiver and hand her my black wool Giorgio Armani overcoat and she takes it from me, 
carefully airkissing my right cheek, then she performs the exact same movements on Price 
while taking his Armani overcoat. (7) 
Read literally, as she takes both of their “Armani overcoat[s]” and greets them both with “the exact 
same movements,” the only remaining distinctions between the two characters is temporal, 
indicated by “then” and the presence of a first and third person. Where Söderlind notes, in general 
terms that find support elsewhere in the narrative, that “Tim and Patrick are frequently confused for 
each other or referred to as one person” (71), this thesis conceives this “confus[ion]” as providing 
the essential circumstance of disappearance – a circumstance of more or less, established uniformity 
between Price and Bateman – that prepares for the narrator's subsequent appearances. 
 
Evelyn, Bateman's girlfriend, is hosting a dinner party in this first chapter when Courtney greets the 
characters at the door and other elements in the pre-dinner scene at Evelyn's contribute to the 
reader's sense of Price and Bateman as interchangeable, a condition implying an established sense 
of uniformity. As Courtney explains to Patrick: 
“We have to save Evelyn. She's been rearranging the sushi for the past hour. She's trying to 
spell your initials – the P in yellowtail, the B in tuna – but she thinks the tuna looks too pale 
[…] and she doesn't have enough yellowtail to finish the B” – Courtney breathes in – “and 
so I think she's going to spell Tim's initials instead. Do you mind?” she asks, only a bit 
worried. […] 
“I'm terribly jealous and I think I better talk to Evelyn,” I say, letting Courtney gently push 
me into the kitchen. (8) 
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The comment “I'm terribly jealous” appears to signify as he doesn't really care in the first 
appearance of this line to the reader as the hyperbolic qualifier, “terribly,” render an allusion to 
sarcasm. Furthermore, as the reader discovers that he does not discuss the matter with Evelyn, a 
recollected appearance of this line seems to confirm the reader's initial interpretation: he doesn't 
really mean it. Arriving in the Evelyn's kitchen, a space that Bateman should feel at ease in, the 
reader discovers that it is Price who feels at ease while Bateman remains in virtually silent unease.   
“I told you to keep Finlandia in this place,” Tim mutters, looking through the bottles […] 
“She never has Finlandia,” he says to no one, to all of us. [Note the series of an absent 
audience, followed by a uniform audience coinciding in the attribution.] 
“Oh god, Timothy. Can't handle Absolut?” Evelyn asks […] 
“Bateman. Drink?” 
“J&B rocks,” I tell him, suddenly thinking it's strange that Meredith [Price's girlfriend] 
wasn't invited. (9) 
Price offers Bateman a drink as if he were the host, or as if he were acting on behalf of the host. 
 
Bateman takes the occasion to begin a process of distinguishing himself from Price on the basis of 
taste, which is an opportunity that appears here through the concept of choice, introduced by Price's 
shown preference for “Finlandia,” over “Absolut.” Price's preferred drink appears in the novel with 
an emphasis placed on the latter two syllables, signaling its distinction within the composition of 
the sign. While conceding that the particular arrangement of emphasis in Price's utterance may in 
fact accurately reflect a common pronunciation of the name, one perhaps derived from a real 
television commercial, lacking this special knowledge closes that line of interpretation off, leaving 
it to remain as speculation. Attributing the pronunciation to a voice may in fact be considered 
irrelevant, as the sign appearing on the visual level sufficiently illustrates the concept of a sign with 
the capacity of rendering choice between difference – a visual cue in the sign where in the narrative 
the notion choice makes its first appearance: between emphasized and non-emphasized letters, 
between verbal and visual interpretation, between individual preference and no preference, between 
Finlandia and Absolut, and for Bateman, presumably between Absolut and J&B. There is no 
evidence that Evelyn keeps specifically for Bateman, in the sense that she does not “keep Finlandia 
in this place” for Price, or simply happens to have J&B among “the bottles” (9). 
 
In terms of the limits of ontological language – the sign may represent a physiological body affected 
by alcohol, but the language itself cannot appear affected by alcohol – renders virtually no distinct 
value associated with one alcoholic drink as opposed to another: marking its play here as, according 
to the framework of this thesis, only reflecting its capacity to appear in a state of relative visual 
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difference: in other words, to render the perception of choice amongst virtually interchangeable 
objects. 
 
Directly after Bateman makes his choice and the language demonstrates its extensive capacity to 
appear in variety, the language appears in a pair of repetitions; a repetition of repetition; 
representations; reproductions. The extensive capacity of language to appear in variety and through 
variety, exponential numbers of contingent relations that constitute the vast potential of language to 
appear in opposition to uniformity: appearing in opposition to disappearing. 
"Oh god. It's a mess," Evelyn gasps. "I swear I'm going to cry." 
'The sushi looks marvelous," I tell her soothingly. 
"Oh it's a mess," she wails. "It's a mess." 
"No, no, the sushi looks marvelous," I tell her and in an attempt to be as consoling as 
possible I pick up a piece of the fluke and pop it in my mouth, groaning with inward 
pleasure, and hug Evelyn from behind; my mouth still full, I manage to say "Delicious." 
(emphasis added; 9) 
Significantly, Evelyn is convinced that “a mess” has appeared, and this may be perceived as an 
allusion to the capacity of language to appear in excessive variety. In rendering the actual 
disappearance of the repetitious words and phrases, the revisited excerpt contains no reference to 
the sushi other “fluke” which is the name of a flatfish, but also signifies as (1) (n.) an unlikely 
chance occurrence, especially a surprising piece of luck and (2) (v.) to achieve (something) by luck 
rather than skill (Oxford Dictionaries). Furthermore, in this 'proofread' excerpt, Evelyn appears to 
appeal to “god” as she mourns. The fact that Bateman ingests the fluke and “manages to say 
'Delicious'” begs to be considered in terms of the ontological character of language in a corporeal 
circumstance: this discussion appears below in relation to the influence of Dante's Inferno on 
American Psycho. 
 
Significantly, on the next page, Bateman's physical appearance receives its first assessment and it 
appears thoroughly narcissistic: "Hi. Pat Bateman," I say, offering my hand, noticing my reflection 
in a mirror hung on the wall - and smiling at how good I look” (10). In the novel, this excerpt 
appears set apart in a paragraph of its own, so the indication that he is actually “offering his hand” 
and name to another character in the apartment is not an entirely lucid image of interaction. 
Furthermore this excerpt follows shortly after his entrance into the room that is occupied by 
strangers, who are literally strange: as he enters, he clears his throat – a common gesture used by a 
person to signal their person's presence – and is barely (or “warily”) noticed. 
"Ahem," I cough. 
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Vanden looks over warily, probably drugged to the eyeballs. Stash doesn't move. 
"Hi. Pat Bateman," I say, offering my hand, noticing my reflection in a mirror hung on the 
wall - and smiling at how good I look. 
She takes it; says nothing. Stash starts smelling his fingers. 
Smash cut and I'm back in the kitchen. (emphasis added; 10) 
The odd appearance of a semicolon here between “she takes it” and “says nothing” may perhaps be 
perceived as a signal that the language is not entirely intended to be interpreted within the terms of 
representative realism. Rather it could be read literally as the visual image that does not 'speak' to 
the matter of whether or not she has literally taken the offered “hand”: the “hand,” in the sense that 
is either detachable or a thing apart from Bateman's body, in a similar sense that the word hand 
appears separately from the word body. This sense of separation literally appears in the narcissistic 
element of the excerpt, where the image of Bateman is represented in the mirror. The confusion 
generated through the narcissistic element, insofar as Bateman may appear to be introducing 
himself and offering his hand to the mirror, lends sufficient plausibility for the entire interaction for 
to be considered in terms of language’s full capacity for representation without real consequence: 
that is Bateman may literally offer his “hand” to Vanden and Stash, who then curiously “[s]tarts 
smelling his fingers” while not, in any real terms, suffer the loss of his hand. The final line in the 
scene, another filmic cue, signals the work of representation in the scene. 
 
“Back in the kitchen,” where things are really heating up between Evelyn and Price, the liberation 
that the above discussion seems to afford to Bateman through his access to language on the 
representational level disappears as Evelyn gives him instructions to follow, just before she 
effectively exacerbates the interchangeability of Bateman and Price by disappearing with Price. 
"I have to talk to you," Evelyn says. 
"What about?" I come up to her. 
"No," she says and then pointing at Tim, "to Price." (11) 
Two pages earlier Price began to construct the premise of their mutual disappearance out of literally 
nothing: “Price hands me a drink and walks toward the living room while trying to remove 
something invisible from his blazer. 'Evelyn, do you have a lint brush?'" (9). Shortly thereafter Price 
repeats Evelyn description of Bateman as the “boy next door”: a common expression signifying as 
normal (i.e. harmless). “'Boy next door.' Tim smirks and nods, then reverses his expression and 
hostilely asks Evelyn again if she has a lint brush” (emphasis added; 10). Incidentally, Tim's 
“smirk” indicates he knows something ahead of time: that Evelyn's next-door neighbor would be 
murdered and her head would appear in Bateman's freezer (112). The escalation in Price's expressed 
hostility toward Evelyn appears without reason in the narrative and its appearance is repeated, 
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though with in a variation of the word “hostilely,” just before the two of them disappear, after 
Evelyn addresses Bateman. 
“No,” she says and then pointing at Tim, “to Price.” 
Tim still glares at her fiercely. I say nothing and stare at Tim's drink. (11) 
 
Bateman's act of “star[ing] at Tim's drink” recalls the discussion on “Finlandia” and language's 
capacity for variety. Through the conception of language's acceptance of variety, hypothetically 
perceived by Evelyn as “a mess,” potentially offers a framework for perceiving Evelyn's 
disappearance with Price as more than a search for a lintbrush and more than a simple conversation: 
she is in a variety of relationships with, at least, Bateman, “the boy next door” and the hostile, 
deviant, Price. In consideration of the significance of Judeo-Christian concepts in the novel, as are 
discussed below, it may appear reasonable to consider Evelyn's name in reference to the story of 
Eve's problematic relationship with God, the serpent and the Tree of Knowledge. Yet, in contrast to 
the story in the book of Genesis, Evelyn's innocence remains in tact, relative, that is, to Bateman's. 
In the second chapter of the novel titled “Morning,” Bateman consumes three varieties of apple – a 
“Japanese apple-pear,” “apple butter” and “apple-cinnamon tea” (26-7). Furthermore, in this chapter 
the narrator describes his apartment in terms that could be considered as a contemporary 
materialist's vision of paradise: loaded with expensive high-tech entertainment equipment and 
appliances, expensive artwork, designer furniture, and a hygiene routine reflective of a spa-quality 
treatment. Further speculation is beyond the scope of this thesis. It only remains to mention that 
support for this hypothetical inversion of the traditional conception of Eve's corruption may be 
literally found to revolve around Bateman's failure to choke Luis Carruthers: 
my index fingers touch each other just above Luis's Adam's apple. I start to squeeze, 
tightening my grip, but it's loose enough to let Luis turn around - still in slow motion - so he 
can stand facing me (147). 
 
Following Evelyn's instructions, Patrick finishes preparing the table and the aggression that began 
to appear in the disguise of sarcasm in the expression “I'm terribly jealous,” as Price and Bateman 
began to be perceived as interchangeable, appears to have reached its limit of containment. The 
guests, seated at the table: 
[wait] for Evelyn and Timothy to return from getting Price a lint brush. […] [They] come 
back perhaps twenty after we've seated ourselves and Evelyn looks only slightly flushed. 
Tim glares at me as he takes the seat next to mine […] (11) 
As the reason for “Tim's glare” is never explicitly stated or even alluded to in the text, it may 
simply be considered as marking the boiling point for Bateman's antagonism. In other words, he has 
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internalized his antagonism while the notion of interchangeability has effectively limited his 
capacity to appear in the value of an individual. 
 
Insofar as his appearance, contingent on the basis of name (or initials) and body (the assumed affair 
with Price), has succumbed to uniformity, the narrator following an objective to appear evokes a 
novel contingency, a system of values that has is traditionally characterized by disagreement, 
namely politics. In the circumstance of this antagonism having reached its threshold, Patrick's re-
appears by delivering a political monologue at the dinner table, the content of which appears as a 
laundry list of socio-economic and etho-political statements, some of which appear contrary the 
opinions that Price has uttered or made allusions to since the beginning of the novel. The 
monologue begins to appear under the surface of the narrative as Price reads the headline from a 
magazine titled Deception: 
“The Death of Downtown,” he says: then pointing at each word in the headline, “Who-
gives-a-rat's-ass?” […] 
“Hey,” Vanden says, as if she was insulted. “That affects us.” 
“Oh ho ho,” Tim says warningly. “That affects us? What about the massacres in Sri Lanka, 
honey? Doesn't that affect us too?”[…] 
“Oh come on, Price,” I say. “There are more important problems than Sri Lanka to worry 
about. Sure our foreign policy is important, but there are more pressing problems at hand.” 
“Like what?” he asks without looking away from Vanden. “By the way, why is there an ice 
cube in my soy sauce?” 
“No,” I start hesitantly. “Well we have to end apartheid for one. And slow down the nuclear 
arms race, stop terrorism and world hunger […] Better and more affordable health care for 
the elderly, control and find a cure for the AIDS epidemic, clean up environmental damage 
[…] We have to ensure that college education is affordable for the middle class and protect 
Social Security for senior citizens […] and reduce the influence of political action 
committees.” 
The table stares at me uncomfortably, even Stash, but I'm on a roll. 
“But economically we're still a mess […] We also need to provide training and jobs for the 
unemployed as well as protect existing American jobs from unfair foreign imports […] At 
the same time we need to promote economic growth […] hold down interest rates while 
promoting opportunities for small businesses and controlling mergers and big corporate 
takeovers” 
Price nearly spits up his Absolut after this comment but I try to make eye contact with each 
one of them […] [14] 
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Importantly, Price is shocked by Bateman's statement which signals that he has acquired his 
individual appearance, yet again, in his mimetic, political candidate's speech-act replete with 
economic-political analysis reflecting a well-informed, reasonable, bi-partisan consciousness, 
Bateman is threatened by an accumulation of broader social forces effecting disappearance: 
specifically in his assumption of mimetic representation; in his orientation toward idealized as 
opposed to realized aims; and in the course of thorough analysis – Baudrillard reminds his readers 
“'to analyse' literally means 'to dissolve'” (11). As the general reader feels prepared to follow along 
in agreement with Bateman's stated political concerns, a consensus appears that transcends the 
'border' between the contemporary worlds of the novel and of the reader. The narrative's logic 
oriented toward the production of appearance is sensitive of this encroaching uniformity and 
responsive in constructing another 'novel' turn of events, a new contingency through which to 
appear differently. 
 
Bateman's internal thought process appears for the first time in the narrative, significantly at the 
point of an explicit reference to vision as he “tr[ies] to make eye contact with each of them.” What 
appears as the thought process is the disciplinary logic adjusted by the post-disciplinary 
circumstance of mass production. 
Price nearly spits up his Absolut after this comment but I try to make eye contact with each 
one of them, especially Vanden, who if she got rid of the green streak and the leather and 
got some color – maybe joined an aerobics class, slipped on a blouse, something by Laura 
Ashley – might be pretty. But why does she sleep with Stash? He's lumpy and pale and has a 
bad cropped haircut and it as least ten pounds overweight; there's no muscle tone beneath 
the black T-shirt. 
Bateman's disciplinary analysis of Vanden and Stash, “artiste [types] from ohmygod the 'East' 
Village” (5), is explicitly informed by values attributable to the concept of a model appearing in 
advertisements, a form, which carries in its sign the immanent disappearance of the real. Rather 
than reflecting an interest in disciplinary techniques that transform individuals into the biopower to 
reproduce the discipline values through an interiorization. 
 
The conceptual disappearance of the real is formally produced in the novel through an apparent 
discord between what appears in the realm of the body and what appears in the realm of the 
narrator’s thoughts. The character of his conscious thought concerned with reproducing models and 
attended by misogyny and materialism strongly conflicts with the character of his voiced utterance. 
The conclusion of his monologue, now turned toward addressing social and ethical concerns, makes 
him appear to the witness subject as disingenuous, duplicitous, uncertain. To the other dinner 
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guests, not privy to his thoughts, continue to perceive him by character of his statements regarding 
his social and ethical concerns. In a sense, this di-vision recalls the schizophrenia inherited by the 
western world, of the separation between being and praxis, where the witness-subject has the 
privilege of seeing the being in language, the characters in the world of the narrator perceive him 
only in relation to his actions. 
“But we can't ignore our social needs either. […] provide food and shelter for the homeless 
and oppose racial discrimination and promote civil rights while promoting equal rights for 
women […] encourage a return to traditional moral values and curb graphic sex and 
violence on TV, in movies, in popular music, everywhere. Most importantly we have to 
promote general social concern and less materialism in young people.” 
I finish my drink. The table sits facing me in total silence. Courtney's smiling and seems 
pleased. Timothy just shakes his head in bemused disbelief. Evelyn is completely mystified 
by the turn the conversation has taken and she stands, unsteadily, and asks if anyone would 
like dessert. [14-15] 
Despite the duplicitous nature of Bateman's identity that appears in the moment of crisis as the two 
contrary ethical dispositions collide, the content of the monologue persists as a contingent system of 
values: constituting potentialities for the narrator's subsequent appearances. Each item on this list of 
concerns – homelessness, racism, feminism, traditional morality, curbing representations of graphic 
sex and violence in media, materialism – principles a model that by virtue of antagonism, allows 
him to pursue his objective to appear. This early scene in the novel appears to render a model of 
appearance that is based on the antagonism between the apparatus (Price) and its subject (Bateman). 
There are many instances in the early pages of the novel to support this relationship; recall the very 
Bateman's very first appearance in the “doubly removed mode: a second person pronoun in a 
quotation” (Serpell 58) as Price, says “I hate my job, you've told me you hate yours” (emphasis in 
original, 3).  Finally, at the moment that Bateman's conscious appears, it appears to have 
internalized the model of antagonism as a productive model for appearances. 
 
Having interiorized the antagonistic model conditioning duality, this antagonistic duality conditions 
the relationship between the world wherein Bateman appears (the fictional, albeit contingent world) 
and Bateman's consciousness (the limits of imagination), the question of which is ever actually 
appearing seems to reflect the irresolvable relation between the representation and the 'real' 
(following the introduction of the Archimedean point). The result of this dynamism, which 
produces virtually endless opportunities for the construction of new value systems, of new 
contingencies, plays itself out throughout the entirety of the novel – to the point where the narrator, 
near the very of the novel, now turned self reflexive seems to admit to this process: “My self is 
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fabricated, an aberration. I am a noncontingent human being. My personality is sketchy and 
unformed […] this confession has meant nothing … ” (emphasis in original, 352). This “nothing...” 
concludes the passage temporary inner monologue, a technique that appears only in this chapter of 
the novel. Bateman returns to seemingly important conversation with Jean, his secretary, while they 
are out on date. 
“Appearances can be deceiving,” I admit carefully. 
“No,” she says, shaking her head, sure of herself for the first time. “I don't think they are 
deceiving. They're not.” 
“Sometimes, Jean,” I explain, “the lines separating appearance – what you see – and reality 
– what you don't become, well, blurred.” 
“That's not true,” she insists. “That's simply not true.” 
“Really?” I ask, smiling. 
 “I didn't use to think so,” she says. “Maybe ten years ago I didn't. But I do now.” 
“What do you mean?” I ask, interested. “You used to?” (353) 
Jean's response that begins with “I didn't think use to think so” has an uncertain character in relation 
to her previous statements as well as Bateman's. Importantly, even within a section that seems to 
explicitly challenge the framework's premise with language conditioned by Jean's love, simply 
presents an yet another novel contingency through which Bateman may appear. 
… a flood of reality. I get an odd feeling that this is a crucial moment in my life and I'm 
startled by the suddenness of what I guess passes for an epiphany. There is nothing of value 
I can offer her. For the first time I see Jean as uninhibited; she seems stronger, less 
controllable, wanting to take me into a new and unfamiliar land – the dreaded uncertainty of 
a totally different world. I sense she wants to rearrange my life in a significant way – her 
eyes tell me this and I see truth in them, I also know someday she will be locked in the 
rhythm of my insanity. […] This relationship will probably lead to nothing … this didn't 
change anything. I imaging her smell clean, like tea … (354) 
The novel's final words THIS IS NOT AN EXIT are haunting as long as they remain explained. 
While it was posited above that these words might mark the reader's departure from the novel's flow 
of communication, it is only to enter the flow of communication in the 'real world' where everything 
struggles against their own disappearance, even the novel must stay in print. 
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4. Findings and Suggestions for Further Research 
 
Constructing an analysis on the basis of an interest in what the subject can do, presents an immanent 
challenge that in doing so, in allowing the language to do what it can and then describe it ultimately 
contributes to its limitations. It is my hope that, contrary than close the text with this analysis, this 
perspective brings livens it. As acknowledged the scope of this thesis was limited primarily to the 
first chapter: from the appearance of what might be considered in the vein of realism to the 
disappearance of the real. This leaves the task of the examining how an addiction to appearance 
may continue, and specifically under what contingencies within a framework readily acknowledged 
as a space where the real has disappeared from. 
 
This paper has attempted to argue that Bret Easton Ellis's controversial novel American Psycho is 
an extraordinarily-controlled, yet radically-playful, literary novel that offers significant insight into 
the contemporary human condition. The ethical concerns related to the novel's depictions of 
misogyny and violence problematized the novel's public appearance were exacerbated by the 
absences of a consoling etiology, a system of justice and, moreover, recourse to a system of certain 
meaning. It was these latter features that prompted this examination to discover an alternative, non-
traditional and ultimately, in some cases, anti-traditional framework for its discussion. Not only did 
the publication of Gilles Deleuze's on a society of control coincide with that of the novel, the 
concept provided a strong philosophical reference for accepting the novel's feature of uncertainty. 
 
Following the assumption that the narrator's fundamental objective is to appear steers the analysis 
toward examinations of contingency: on what basis does the narrator appear? The contingency of 
the reader resolves the framework of the narrator's appearance. The reader transmuted, becomes the 
narrator's witness. The commonly discussed and never resolved uncertainty of – whether or not the 
narrator exists or is a figment of the imagination and likewise, whether the murders occur or were 
imagined – is resolved by this framework: the witness can testify with certainty that he / she has 
witnessed the murders. 
 
This leads to an in-depth examination of the language's formal means of producing contingency, 
including the limited value of the subject-narrator. The narrator-subject's value as a vehicle through 
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which language may appear is conditioned, by the subject's relation uncertain terms in the history of 
knowledge, such as the exemplary question of the after-life. 
 
I believe, given the time, that the logic proposed in this examination of the narrative form could be 
applied to the entirety of the novel. The notions of appearance and disappearance – insofar as they 
are related to the notions of the real and the representation – offer, perhaps, a more interesting 
reason for applying this logic to the novel's trajectory. Theoretically, an exploration using similar 
logic would reveal Ellis's creative capacities to create opportunities in the language for the narrator 
to appear in relation to the forces of disappearance, among which the essential contingency of 
maintaining the interest of the subject-witness must be counted, if not entirely prioritized. 
 
Resorting to the extreme violence depicted in the narration reflects an extreme will to create and an 
anarchic tendency in terms of author background research and freedom of expression. With regard 
to this 'delimited' framework, the work, which runs for almost 400 pages, presumably exhausts the 
Ellis's ability to construct additional variations of narrator's contingency. As these contingencies 
are, in a sense, a direct reflection of the contingencies appearing to the creator, an 'exhaustive' 
exegesis may have the significant potential to 'catalog' the modes of contingency available to the 
being in the world in language, or at least, available to Bret Easton Ellis. Considering this as a 
catalog of contingencies of a particular milieu of Manhattan, NY at the height of advanced 
capitalism may considerably contribute to the project's allure.    
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